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The implication of neoclassical economic theory is that 
equivalent and compensating variation values should be nearly 
equal. However, empirical studies have derived results which are 
contrary to economic theory. Equivalent and compensating 
variation have been found to differ by a considerable amount, 
sometimes as much as two thousand percent.
This paper provides insight into why compensating and equivalent 
variation values differ when empirically measured. In a 
contingent valuation scenario, a questionnaire was designed to 
elicit compensating and equivalent variation values for Missoula, 
Montana. The three major results of this study are: 1) the
calculation of compensating and equivalent variation values for 
Rattlesnake Creek water, 2) the rejection of the invariance 
hypothesis, which underlies the most commonly used decision 
theory, and 3) the presentation of a new decision theory called 
prospect theory.
The calculation of compensating and equivalent variation values 
for Rattlesnake Creek drinking water resulted in dollar figures of 
$2.80 and $6.40, respectively. The magnitude of disparity between 
these values is similar to many other empirical studies.
Two tests were used in analyzing the validity of the invariance 
hypothesis. Both of these tests showed that this hypothesis does 
correctly predict the way in which individuals make decisions. 
This study shows that individuals' decisions are not symmetric 
when they are confronted with choices that involve outcomes of 
gains and losses. For example, it was found that individuals 
viewed the loss of the right to consume Rattlesnake Creek water 
much more adversely than they viewed the gain of the right to 
consume this water. This discrepancy is termed the loss aversion 
effect.
The final area of interest for this paper concerns prospect 
theory. It is presented as an alternative decision theory. 
Prospect theory explicitly assumes that individuals view potential 
losses much more strongly than they do potential gains. It is 
assumed in this paper that individuals equate equivalent variation 
decisions with a loss and compensating variation decisions with a 
gain. It is proposed that the loss aversion effect plays a 
substantial role in explaining the empirically measured difference 
between compensating and equivalent variation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
AND METHODS EMPLOYED
Overview
A characteristic of public goods is the inability of the market to 
put a price upon them. Contingent valuation is a technique which has 
been developed to alleviate this market failure problem. The technique 
of contingent valuation creates an artificial market. Within this 
artificial market, dollar values are derived for the goods under 
consideration. One method of contingent valuation involves using a 
questionnaire which can elicit both compensating and equivalent 
variation values. These two measures of value are used to calculate 
consumer's surplus. In many studies which use the contingent valuation 
technique, the compensating and equivalent variation values have 
differed by a considerable amount.
The focus of this paper is directed toward the two measures of 
comsumer's surplus, compensating and equivalent variation. According to 
neoclassical economic theory, the measurement of compensating and 
equivalent variation should result in equivalent values, except for the 
negligible difference which may accrue due to income effects. Due to 
the type of good which is usually measured, the income effect is usually
1
small. However, these two measures of consumer's surplus often differ 
when empirically measured. Examples of the types of goods which have 
been measured are: fishing sites, clean air, and free flowing rivers.
The following chapters are concerned with why the empirically measured 
disparity between compensating and equivalent variation occurs.
Outline of Paper
This paper is comprised of five chapters. Chapter one is the 
introduction for the paper. In chapter two there is a literature review 
for the concepts of consumer's surplus and risk analysis. Within this 
chapter, the theoretical concepts are presented, along with the 
theoretical and empirical problems which have been encountered. Also 
included within this section is a statement of the problem that this 
paper addresses.
The literature review relating to risk analysis pertains to the way 
individuals make decisions under uncertainty. A chronological synopsis 
of the evolution of risk analysis is given. This synopsis includes 
mathematical expectations, expected utility, and von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's theories. A new theory of explaining decisions under 
risk, referred to as prospect theory, is also presented. The 
possibility that prospect theory alleviates some of the discrepancy 
between the compensating and equivalent variation measures is discussed 
in the conclusion of this chapter.
2
The proposition that the failure of the hypothesis of invariance 
leads to the empirically measured discrepancy between consumer's surplus 
values is presented in chapter three. This hypothesis is part of a set 
of hypotheses which make up decision theory. It is suggested that 
invariance fails because of two reasons: nonlinear decision weights and
framing bias. To test these hypotheses, an empirical study is designed 
to see if nonlinear decision weights and framing bias exist in a 
situation where compensating and equivalent variation are measured. 
Rattlesnake Creek's drinking water is the commodity which is chosen to 
elicit these consumer's surplus values.
Chapters four and five focus on the statistical analysis which is 
derived from the empirical study. There are three main objectives of 
this analysis. Two objectives are concerned with finding evidence of 
nonlinear decision weights and framing bias while deriving compensating 
and equivalent variation values. The third objective is to analyze the 
variables which have an impact on the two measures of consumer's 
surplus. The results and their implications are discussed in chapter 
five.
3
Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW OF CONSUMER'S SURPLUS AND RISK ANALYSIS
2.1 Introduction
The origin of consumer's surplus dates back to the mid 19th century 
and to the economist Jules Dupuit [Dupuit 1849]. Since its inception, 
the concept of consumer's surplus has been consistently beset with 
problems. Curiously, with all of its problems, few economic theorists 
have given it much attention. This chapter provides the reader with a 
literature review of consumer's surplus and risk analysis. Section two 
explains the concept of consumer's surplus as well as some of the 
different types of consumer's surplus which exist. Section three 
presents the problem which this paper addresses. This section shows 
that in empirical tests, two different measures of consumer's surplus 
result in vastly differring values even though economic theory 
stipulates that these values be nearly equivalent. The fourth section 
of this chapter provides a literature review of risk or behaviour under 
uncertainty. This literature review covers the historical development 
of risk analysis up to the current state of the art. The fifth and 
final section of this chapter presents a new theory of risk called 
prospect theory. Prospect theory appears to have potential for 
explaining at least some of the discrepancy in measurement between the
4
two theoretically equivalent measures of consumer's surplus. This 
potential which prospect theory has for explaining the discrepancy is 
also explored in this section.
2.2 Definitions of Consumer's Surplus
Alfred Marshall defined consumer's surplus to be: "The excess of
the price which he, (the consumer) would be willing to pay rather than 
go without the thing, over that which he actually does pay" [Marshall 
1922 p.124]. However, his hypothesis that the marginal utility of money 
is constant was found to be incorrect. The clarification of the 
concepts associated with consumer's surplus can be traced back to the 
work of Sir John R. Hicks. For an expanded exposition of the theory of 
consumer's surplus see appendix three.
An income compensated demand curve underlies Hicks' definition of 
consumer's surplus. For his definition he states: "It is the
compensating variation in income, whose loss would just offset the fall 
in price, and leave the consumer no better off than before" [Hicks 1942 
pp.40-413. This is the area PABP1 in figure 2-1. It is expressed in 
monetary terms for a price decrease on a Hicksian income compensated 
demand curve.
Hicks referred to this consumer's surplus as compensating 
variation. It shows, for a price decrease, how much the consumer would 
be willing to pay in order to consume at the new price level. The 
amount that the consumer is willing to pay just erases the gain in real
5
income which the consumer attains due to the This compensating variation 
measure can be divided into two separate components. The first segment, 
PP1AC, is the cost savings which accrues to the consumer on the quantity 
which he was purchasing before the price change. This rectangle shows 
the change in what the consumer has to pay. The second component shows 
the gain which accrues to the consumer due to the increased level of 
consumption. The points of the hypotenuse of the triangle ABC are a 
measure of the marginal valuations which the consumer places upon each 
new unit of output that is consumed. When this marginal valuation is 
equal to the new price, the consumer will have no incentive to move from 
that point. Thus, this second segment of consumer's surplus is the 
difference between the marginal valuations of the extra units AB and the 
price which is paid for them.
Equivalent Variation
The compensating variation is not the only measure of consumer's 
surplus to be considered. Henderson pointed out: "The compensatory
variation may be different according as to whether we consider the loss 
of income which is worth bearing in order to obtain the availability of 
X or alternatively, the gain in income which will compensate for 
abandoning all purchase of X" [Henderson 1941 p.119].
Hicks referred to this new element as equivalent variation. It can 
be thought of as the sum of money which changes hands if the consumer is 
exempted from the price change. This sum of money makes him as well off 
as if he participated in the new price.
6
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Compensating Variation
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Both compensating and equivalent variation can be perceived from 
the gain or loss perspective. It depends upon the circumstances. 
Equivalent variation always measures the amount of money an individual 
must receive or pay out to keep him at the status quo or as well off as 
before the price change, the introduction of a new good, etc. Thus, 
depending upon whether the price of a good increases or decreases, the 
individual will make payments or receive payments, respectively. 
Conversely, compensating variation always measures the sum of money that 
an individual is willing to pay or receive in order to consume at the 
new price, etc. Thus, for compensating variation, if the price of a 
good decreases the consumer is willing to pay to be able to consume the 
good at the lower price.
Equivalent and compensating variation, along with Marshall's 
definition of consumer’s surplus, constitute the most frequently 
referred to and used measures. There are further measures of consumer's 
surplus once the constraint of constant utility of money is lifted. 
But, because compensating and equivalent variation are the most common 
measures of value and the focus of the latter chapters of this paper, 
they are the only ones to which I will refer.
Differences in the Measures
It is important to discern the differences between Marshall's and 
Hicks' measures of consumer's surplus. The first point where they 
differ is that Marshall's analysis implies a constraint on the quantity 
purchased. "Marshall's definition corresponds to the amount which the
8
consumer would be willing to pay, if he could not get any of the 
commodity otherwise, for the opportunity to buy, at the existing price 
the amount which he is in fact buying” [Henderson 1941 p.117]. In 
either of Hicks' definitions, there is no constraint upon the amount of 
output which the consumer wishes to purchase.
An effective technique that illustrates the magnitudes of
difference between the measures involves the use of indifference curves. 
In figure 2-2, the vertical axis measures income, with M being the 
consumer's total income, or the expenditure on the n-1 goods. On the 
horizontal axis lies the n'th good X. The price of X is given by the 
slope of the budget line ML.
Prior to the introduction of X the consumer has a utility level 
that corresponds to the indifference curve I (this example follows 
Mishan 1976 pp.417-418). The introduction of X to the consumer's 
commodity bundle raises his welfare to 11. His utility is maximized at 
the tangency point Q1, consuming P amount of X. The three measures of 
welfare that arise from the introduction of this good can be calculated 
in the following manner. In this example, the compensating variation 
measures the maximum amount that the consumer is willing to pay to be 
able to purchase X at the stated price. The dashed budget line Y1Z is 
parallel to ML, meaning that income has been decreased but prices have
remained constant. The income MY1 is the maximum amount of money that
the consumer would pay in order to consume P of X. If the consumer
would pay a larger amount, he would be on an indifference curve lower 
than I, meaning that he is less well off in his new position than he was
9
before the introduction of X. MY1 is the amount of money that makes the 
consumer indifferent to position I where no X is consumed and 11 where 
OP of X is consumed.
Equivalent variation measures the minimum sum that the consumer 
would accept to forego any consumption of X. This amount is Y2M. With 
this sum, his total income level has been elevated enough to place him 
on the higher indifference curve I1, which is where he would have been 
if he would have consumed X in the amount that he wished.
In this diagram the Marshallian measure is the vertical distance 
Q1R. This is the maximum sum the consumer would pay to buy X, provided 
that he is constrained to buy OP of X. OP is the amount which would be 
purchased if the consumer had no constraints placed upon him.
Significance of Income Effects
An assumption of Marshalls which affected his analysis of
consumer's surplus was that the marginal utility of money was constant.
Notice the implications of this assumption. If you assume this to be 
correct, the slopes of the indifference curves I and 11 at Q1 and R in 
figure 2-2 would be equal. That is, differences in income would not
affect the marginal rate of substitution of X for income. If the slopes
of the indifference curves I and 11 are equal, this implies that the 
vertical distance between the curves is constant. If the marginal 
utility of money was constant throughout the indifference curves, then 
the vertical distant between the curves would also be constant 
throughout. If the vertical distance between the curves was constant
10
throughout, the amount of money the consumer is willing to pay to 
consume X, the amount of money the consumer must be paid to forego the 
consumption of X, and the Marshallian measure of constrained consumption 
would all be equivalent. If the marginal utility of money is constant 
it would eliminate any distinction between the three different measures 
of consumer's surplus.
Since the marginal utility of money is not constant, notice the 
differring monetary measurements of equivalent and compensating 
variation. None of the early authors who dealt with the two measures of 
variation put any constraints on their size. However, they all, in some 
form, implied that they were equal except for the income effect. Hicks 
states that Marshall's analysis is a good approximation for his measures 
so long as income effects are negligible [Hicks 1956]. He defines the 
magnitude of the change as a relation to the substitution effect. He 
states: "The income effect must clearly .... be small in relation to
the substitution effect itself” [Hicks 1956 p.77]. Hotelling wrote that 
the only time these measures of value break down is when "the variations 
under consideration are too large a part of the total economy of the 
person" [Hotelling 1938 p.289]. Regarding this subject Henderson stated 
that the level of utility is the same, although "its expression in terms 
of money income is different since the significance of money varies" 
[Henderson 1941 p.119]. Further on in his article he concludes that the 
measure of consumer's surplus that is used is of little import: "since
we shall normally expect the results to lie so close together that it 
would not matter which we choose" [Henderson 1941 p.121],
11
FIGURE 2-2  
Two Measures of Consumer’s Surplus
X per unit of time
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The concept of compensating and equivalent variation being 
approximately equal, given the good being measured comprises a small 
amount of the total budget expenditure, is illustrated below in figure 
2-3. The horizontal axis measures the good X. X is a normal commodity 
with a positive marginal utility of money. Intuitively, the argument 
follows this path: As the price of X increases relative to the other
consumptive goods, the consumer becomes less willing to pay to be able 
to consume it. Also, the consumer does not require as much compensation 
to forego the use of X because at the higher price of X, the individual 
is consuming very little. As the amount of expenditure on the good 
decreases, both measures of value tend toward zero and each other.
This may be shown graphically. In figure 2-3, the vertical axis 
measures the composite good Y. Prior to the introduction of good X the 
individual's level of welfare is given by I. With the introduction of 
good X the individual's welfare rises to 11. The price of the commodity 
is given by the slope of the budget line MZ. The consumer is maximizing 
his welfare at the tangency point A. LM and MN measure equivalent and 
compensating variation values, respectively. It is obvious that 
equivalent variation is greater than compensating variation. Equally 
obvious is that the ratio of equivalent variation to compensating 
variation is greater than one.
Now, assume the price of X increases. Since commodity X is normal, 
the consumer will consume less of it. If the price continues to 
increase, the result will be a decrease in the total expenditure on the 
good X. The new budget line is MU. The higher price of X lowers the
13
consumer's welfare to 12. The higher price decreases both the 
compensating and equivalent variation values. These are MP and OM, 
respectively. Note that both values area decreasing toward zero. As 
the price of X continues to increase, the welfare level will continue to 
decrease and approach the original level of utility, I. When the level 
of welfare descends back to I, the point of tangency between the budget 
line and the indifference curve is at M, indicating zero consumption of 
X. It also indicates zero expenditure on good X. It is assumed for 
this proof that the marginal rate of substitution of X for income is 
less that or equal to the price ratio of good X to income at the 
intersection of the budget line and the vertical axis [Leftwich 1979 
p.92]. This enables a corner solution to exist. The decreasing of the 
welfare level results in both the compensating and equivalent variation 
values approaching closer and closer to zero until the level of utility 
reaches I. At the utility level signified by the indifference curve I, 
both measures are zero. However, as these measures approach zero the 
ratio of equivalent variation to compensating variation approaches one, 
meaning that these values are nearly equal. This must occur because 
both values become zero at the same point, where there is no consumption 
of X. This is true so long as the indifference curves are continuous, 
which they are by definition.
Recently, many economists have relied on the vague statements of 
their predecessors in regard to the part income effects play in the 
discrepancy in measurement between compensating and equivalent 
variation. For example Freeman states: "No decisive case can be made
14
for either measure. But, .... in practice this may not be an important 
issue since the two measures, equivalent and compensating variation will 
usually not differ significantly” [Freeman 1979 p.33]- The consensus 
has been that the difference between the two measures would be quite 
small, depending upon what significance the good has on our total 
expenditure function.
In Willig [1976] boundaries are calculated for the size of the 
difference between the two measures for a single price change. Willig 
shows that in most cases, the error in substituting Marshall's 
consumer's surplus for Hicks' measures will be less than the errors 
involved in estimating the income conditions for his constraints. His 
constraints reflect the worries that were noted above i.e., the good 
does not take up a large percentage of expendable income.
2.3 Statement of Problem: Empirical Discrepancies
If all of the above statements hold true, is there a problem 
concerning the difference in measurement between equivalent and 
compensating variation? Unfortunately, as is often the case, this 
theory and its empirical applications are in conflict.
In recent years economists have been attempting to place a dollar 
figure on commodities such as wilderness areas or recreation sites. 
Economists usually value goods and services based upon market 
observations. From this data base a demand curve can be constructed and 
the consumer's surplus can then be derived. The valuation of goods such
15
as those mentioned above poses a problem due to the resource not being 
priced, or only partially priced, in a market.
There have been several techniques developed which attempt to 
simulate an actual market system. These techniques all fall under the 
heading of contingent valuation. To elicit the consumer's willingness 
to pay, there are several available options. One of these is the 
interview method [Knetsch and Davis 1966]. An interview method creates 
a hypothetical market where prices can be imputed, without any 
suggestion or example of an existing operating market [Schulze et al. 
1981].
The interviewer asks the respondents the maximum amount that they 
would pay in order to retain the ability to consume a particular good. 
They are also asked what is the minimum amount of money they would 
accept in order that they would forego the consumption of the good. 
These questions, respectively, measure the consumer's compensating and 
equivalent variation.
It has been asserted that these two measures of value should be 
nearly equal, with the given income constraints. Unfortunately, the 
literature is full of studies which show a large disparity between 
compensating and equivalent variation.
16
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One of the earliest studies using this technique was for the 
valuation of waterfowl [Hammack and Brown 197*13. Data was gathered 
through a questionnaire which was mailed to a sample of hunters within 
the Pacific flyway. Their measure of equivalent variation was $1,044.00 
per year, compared to $247.00 per year for compensating variation. They 
differred by over four hundred percent.
A study by Schulze et al., [1981] imputed valuations by elk hunters 
in Wyoming. They asked the hunters questions through personal 
interviews. The average willingness to pay was $54.00 per year to 
increase sightings of elk from one to five per day. The average 
willingness to sell the right to see five elk per day was $142.00 
[Schulze et al., 1981].
There are numerous other examples that show this disparity (see 
table 2-1). As previously noted, the equivalent variation value does 
not have to be greater than the compensating value. In the examples 
below the equivalent variation happens to be associated with a gain 
while the compensating variation value is associated with a loss.
It seems highly improbable in the cases cited above and other 
studies as well, that the cause for the discrepancies is due to the good 
being a large part of their expenditures relative to their income. In 
most empirical analyses the goods in question do have an income 
elasticity that is greater than zero, but this does not explain such a 
large difference in the measures, especially in aggregation. In an 
analysis involving income effects, Gordon and Knetsch [1979] found
18
through regression results that there was no foundation for the income 
effect being the sole explanation for the differences in the two 
measures.
Many people believe that the disparity problem lies within the 
interview procedure and not with the measurements or theory itself 
[Dwyer and Bowes 1978 and Brookshire et al. 1980]. One problem in 
using interviews may be hypothetical bias. This would occur when 
respondents react inaccurately to the seeming irrelevance of the 
questions. To circumvent this problem the use of a payment vehicle has 
been tried [Rowe 1980]. Instead of asking for a sum of money which the 
respondent would either pay or receive, a more plausible situation such
as paying higher or lower taxes or utility bills is introduced. This
creates a situation to which the consumer can more easily relate.
Table 2-1 is an illustration of the disparity between compensating 
and equivalent variation values. These studies all involved some method 
of the contingent valuation format [Meyer 1979 p.226].
In a study designed to totally eliminate hypothetical bias, people 
were confronted with actual money payments and cash compensations
[Knetsch and Sinden 1984]. Over a series of experiments, the
compensation that was demanded was approximately four times the value 
measured by the maximum willingness to pay to attain the same right.
19
Table 2-1: Studies Showing the Disparity Between Compensating
and Equivalent Variation
Ratio of Responses 
Willingness to Sell 
To
Study Author Willingness to Pay
Saltwater
Recreation Meyer 19:1
Favorite 
Fishing Site Sinclair 20:1
Elk
Hunting
Brookshire 
and Randall 7:1
Wetland
Hunting
Hammack and 
Brown 4:1
Fishing 
a Park Eby 3.5:1
Local Postal 
Service Banford 4:1
Fishing
Pier Banford 3:1
Many economists put forth the idea that only one of the measures of 
value is valid, depending upon who possesses the property right 
[Krutilla and Fisher 1975]. If an individual owns the entitlement, then 
the proper measure would be to ask the person the minimum amount that he 
would have to be paid in order for him to forego the right to use the 
good. According to this hypothesis, if there is a difference between 
empirically measured compensating and equivalent variation values, then 
it matters which measure we use and we should use the measure which 
matches the ''appropriate” entitlement. However, if the disparity
20
between measures is rectified by employing the appropriate entitlement, 
the validity of the Coase Theorem is questioned [Knetsch 1984]. This 
theorem postulates that the same efficient allocations of resources are 
predicted to occur regardless of the initial assignments of rights 
[Coase 1960].
Other possible problems pertaining to the interview method are 
strategic, instrument, information, and sampling or interviewer bias. 
Strategic bias can occur when respondents attempt to influence the study 
by either over or under bidding their true preferences. To counteract 
this, several studies have suggested an outlier range of approximately 
ten standard deviations from the mean bid. Bids outside of this are 
disregarded. Instrument bias comes from the process which is employed 
to discover individuals' preferences. For example, if an iterative
bidding scheme is used, the dollar amount of the starting bids and the 
amount and type of information given about the particular good 
influences the revealed bids. Most studies which now use an iterative 
bidding system vary the starting level of bids as well as the amount of 
information. This serves to identify the two biases if they are present 
in the study. The biases which are associated with sampling and 
interviewing problems can be limited through careful application of 
statistical techniques and objective interviewing procedures.
Two other reasons for the disparity in measures which have been 
mentioned in the literature are: when the question asked implicitly
violates individuals perceptions of the appropriate entitlement, you may 
get "inaccurate" or "emotionally" biased results; and monetary income
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may not be the major determinant of individual welfare.
Studies have been done which specifically test for the presence of 
the aforementioned problems [Schulze et al. 1981]. They were found to 
the most part to be relatively insignificant. Regardless of whether 
biases exist within a study, this paper stands by the hypothesis that 
the biases are consistent across the two measures. Even if there are 
instances of some types of bias and/or income effects that affect one 
measure of value differently from the other, they could not completely 
account for the total disparity between the two measures of value.
2.4 Development of Risk Analysis
When an individual is confronted with a decision without full 
information, there is a possibility that an error will be made. While 
the possibility of an error may be either large or small, the lack of 
complete information results in some risk or uncertainty to the decision 
maker. This section presents the different theories that have evolved 
concerning the way people behave and make decisions under uncertainty.
From the earliest analysis, gambling for a monetary reward has 
provided an excellent example of decision making under uncertainty. In 
particular, people have wanted to know which is the most advantageous 
gamble in which to partake. The theory of Monetary expectations was 
developed to a large degree to satisfy this requirement. It represents 
the earliest theory as recognized in the literature of risk analysis. 
This concept was prevalent until the mid seventeen hundreds.
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The theory of monetary expectation takes the probabilities of all 
of the events that are possible with a particular gamble and multiplies 
them by their respective outcomes (in dollars). If the individual is 
behaving in a rational manner, the choice with the highest monetary 
expectation is the one chosen.
This theory represents a very objective way of of perceiving how 
people react to risk. It assumes that two consumers encountering an 
identical gamble would both evaluate and choose the outcome, with no 
differences in their perceptions of the anticipated risks or the final 
outcome [Bernoulli 1756]. This concept of taking the highest 
mathematical expectation was justified by the law of large numbers i.e., 
the continual participation in a gamble which favors the participant 
with odds greater than 50 percent will eventually result in the 
individual having a greater number of wins than losses [Halvorson 1981].
Savage [1954] has listed the major drawbacks of the theory. The 
first problem concerns the implication that everyone is affected by risk 
to the same magnitude, regardless of the size of the bet. The 
consequence of losing a fifty dollar bet for most college students is, 
in general, greater than the consequence associated with the same bet 
for a Senator. A second problem with mathematical expectations 
surrounds its limitations concerning universal applicability. People 
indulging in making ’poor' gambles and people carrying insurance are a 
few of the cases that have been cited to indicate that the theory of 
mathematical expectations has only a limited applicability.
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Bernoulli's Analysis
If people did not always choose the decision which would bring to 
them the highest expected monetary value, in what manner did they act? 
Daniel Bernoulli [1756] used the terms risk aversion and risk seeking to 
explain this alternative behavior. Risk aversion occurs when a person 
has a preference for a sure gain over a gamble that has higher or equal 
monetary expectation. Risk seeking is when an act of certainty is
rejected in favor of a gamble with lower or equal monetary expectation.
An example of risk seeking would be when an individual, faced with a 
decision involving two options, one being a gift of 10 dollars and the 
other a gamble which has a monetary expectation of 10 dollars or less, 
chooses the gamble. An example involving risk aversion is when an
individual chooses the gift of 10 dollars over a gamble which involves a 
monetary expectation greater than 10 dollars. Whenever a person makes a 
risk averse or risk seeking choice, the highest monetary expectation is 
foregone.
Bernoulli put forth the idea that people maximized utility. He 
stated: "No valid measurement of the value of a risk can be obtained
without consideration given to its utility" (the utility of a possible 
gain or loss) [Bernoulli 1756 p.231. He took the concept of utility and 
substituted it for the dollar outcome when deriving expected values. 
Bernoulli believed that the same rule or thought cannot be used to
evaluate all men's reactions to risk. This was because people have 
different values or utilities associated with monetary outcomes. These 
utilities are a function of their total income.
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According to expected utility theory, each outcome has some 
intrinsic value which varies depending on the individual. The utility 
of each outcome is multiplied or weighted by its* probability of 
occurrence. If the consumer is behaving in a rational manner, he 
chooses the outcome which has the highest expected utility.
Bernoulli's analysis changed the study of risk. It depicts man as 
reacting in a subjective rather than an objective manner when confronted 
with a decision. He thought of utility in cardinal terms, relating it 
to states of wealth. His thesis was that wealth and utility are
positively related. Thus, the larger winnings from a gamble correspond 
to a larger level of utility. However, this utility would behave 
according to the law of diminishing marginal utility. This leads to an 
important concept of Bernoulli's theory: "gains and or losses are a
function of the state of wealth ... [in which] ... the person currently 
exists" [Bernoulli 1956 p.27]. This assumption is a major difference 
between expected utility theory and the theory that is presented later 
in the paper. Bernoulli felt that the above assumptions explained why 
people behaved in either a risk averse or risk seeking manner.
Consider the following example which further illustrates 
Bernoulli's ideas. A very poor person and a wealthy person are both 
confronted with the same choices. They have the option of acquiring 
either a ticket which enables them to a fifty percent chance of winning 
one hundred dollars and a fifty percent chance of winning nothing, or 
thirty dollars in cash. In most cases the thirty dollars is very 
significant to the poor man. Because his total wealth is small, the
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addition of thirty dollars is very significant. It has a very high 
utility for him. More often than not the poor man will choose the risk 
averse choice. He evaluates the utility of a sure thirty dollars higher 
than the utility of one hundred dollars multiplied by one half. The 
wealthy man will, in most cases, hold onto the ticket. A thirty dollar 
gain is relatively insignificant to a person with a large state of 
wealth. This example indicates: 1) The decision with the highest
monetary expectation is not necessarily the decision with the highest 
expected utility; 2) Individuals derive their expected utility from 
their initial wealth state.
Bernoulli’s analysis can also be illustrated graphically. See 
figure 2-H. Let the horizontal axis AR show gains in wealth and the 
vertical axis AQ show utility. The function BS has a negative second 
derivative over this range. Let the initial wealth position be AC and a 
gain to be CD which is a very small amount. The gain in utility which 
is attributable to the CD change in wealth is RH. But, it is clearly 
discernable that the amount of utility which is realized from CD is also 
related to its initial wealth position AC.
Bernoulli has contributed a large amount of work to risk analysis. 
His theorem was dogma for over two hundred years. It was not until the 
late 1940’s and early 1950's that dissatisfaction appeared. The two 
major criticisms of Bernoulli's analysis are summarized below.
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Writing in 1948, Friedman and Savage showed that Bernoulli's 
theorem does not account for people making a fair gamble. The problem 
is due to diminishing marginal utility. Quoting from the authors: "The
rejection of utility maximization for decisions under risk is because of 
the belief in diminishing marginal utility. Diminishing marginal 
utility plus utility maximization implies that individuals would always 
have to be paid to induce them to bear risk" [Friedman and Savage 1948 
p.280]. For example, using Bernoulli's analysis, if a person is 
confronted with a fair bet for a dollar, the person would never accept 
the gamble because the additional dollar he could win would be worth 
less to him than the dollar he could lose.
There is a second problem with Bernoulli's work caused by his use 
of diminishing marginal utility. This concept created an illusion of 
having some objectively measurable quality in goods. The rise of the 
indifference-curve view of utility resulted in utility ceasing to have 
any objective significance [Arrow 1951 p.423].
In a later book, Savage [1954] provided a further critique. 
Bernoulli put forth no reason for supposing that preferences correspond 
to the expected value of some function, with the result being that more 
general possibilities must be considered. Savage also felt that 
features besides expected value functions, such as the range, skewness, 
etc., should be used in determining preferences.
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Von Neumann and Morgenstern's Analysis
In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern finished a book which 
challenged the rejection of expected utility theory. They believe that 
the consumer's objective is to maximize expected utility. The authors 
developed postulates that, if met, lead to the maximization of expected 
utility. These postulates are discussed in von Neumann and Morgenstern 
[1944 pp.40-42] and in Friedman and Savage [1948 pp.279-304]. Arrow 
states about these postulates: "von Neumann and Morgenstern enunciated
a clear set of axioms on choice among probability distributions which 
led to the assumption of maximizing expected utility and which were 
convincing" [Arrow 1951 p.424].
Briefly, these are the postulates which von Neumann and Morgenstern 
formulated. These postulates enabled them to build a conceptual 
structure for the treatment of numerical utilities. Let 'u', 'v', and
•w! represent distinct and different commodity bundles. The first axiom 
is: a complete ordering of utilities. This means that for two
utilities, there are three possible relationships. The commodity bundle 
'u' may be preferred to or indifferent to the bundle 'v', or the 
commodity bundle !v’ may be preferred to the commodity bundle 'u*. 
However, only one of these relationships may exist at any given time 
period.
The second axiom is concerned with ordering and combining. For 
example, if 'u' is preferred to 'v' and 'v' is preferred to 'w’, then 
without any more information we know that 'u' must be preferred to 'w'.
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This is also known as the axiom of transitivity.
The third axiom is contained under the heading of algebra of 
combining. It stipulates that it is irrelevant which order the 
preferences of choice are presented to a decision maker. This is also 
referred to as the postulate of invariance. The role of invariance in 
the decision making process plays a major part in the latter segments of 
this paper.
There are a number of assumptions which have been added to the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern postulates. These are summarized below. In 
defining the domain of the expected utility function (U), most 
economists include the risk aversion assumption; U" < 0. They also 
assume that the overall utility of a gamble is the sum of the expected 
utility of its outcomes, and the utility resulting from integrating a 
gamble with one's assets exceeds the utility of those assets alone. 
This results in the domain of the utility function being the total 
assets of the individual [Kahneman and Tversky 1979 p.264].
Von Neumann and Morgenstern state that the expected utility rule is 
the mathematical expectation or probability - weighted average of the 
utilities of the associated consequences or outcomes. The amount of 
uncertainty of a particular decision is reflected by the dispersion of 
the probability weights over the possible outcomes [Hirshleifer and 
Riley 1979]. A main advantage of von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory 
is that no matter how complicated the structure of any particular 
decision, it is always possible to describe the expected utility
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function by a single probability distribution of the final outcomes, 
assuming that all of the aspects of the postulates are satisfied. Given 
their assumptions, utility becomes a number up to a linear 
transformation. "Their theorem gives a method of assigning utilities to 
individual outcomes so that the utility assigned to any probability 
distribution is the expected value under that distribution of the 
utility of the outcome" [Arrow 1951 p.425].
Other Analyses
In most aspects, the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory is the most 
commonly used theory of risk at present. However, there have been other 
theorems. Friedman and Savage [1948] have presented a a theory in which 
people react in both a risk averse and a risk seeking manner, depending 
on the size of the gamble or risk and the current state of their total 
wealth. Halvorson and Ruby [1981] feel that expected utility theory and 
expected monetary value are both valid under certain conditions. They 
have designed rules which determine the magnitude of the errors involved 
in using both of the theories with the result being that they have 
guidelines for when one theory is preferred over the other.
Comparison of Analyses
The theories which were presented above differ from one another in 
many aspects. However, they do have a few points in common. The first 
point is that the formulation of various commodity choices, under 
uncertainty, are based on specified "states" [Hirshleifer and Riley 1979 
p.1376]. In other words, an individual bases his choice on what state
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or wealth situation he exists in.
A second point is that in general, economists using any of the 
above analysis assume that most individuals behave in a risk averse 
manner. Halvorson states: "The principle empirical evidence in favor
of people being risk averse is that people; prefer to hold a variety of 
assets". [Halvorson and Ruby 1981 p.68]. That is, people prefer a 
portfolio which encompasses many assets to one single asset which may 
have a higher earning ratio. Although noting some glaring 
discrepancies, Hirshleifer and Ruby assume that risk aversion is the 
normal mode for individuals [Hirshleifer and Ruby 1979 p.1382].
What is the reason for bringing forth these two points? The 
analysis which is presented in the following section is based upon an 
assumption that differs from point one above. This difference results 
in the conclusion that people do not usually behave in a risk averse 
manner. In turn, this result may then shed some light on the reason why 
equivalent and compensating variation differ empirically despite what 
conventional theory suggests.
2.5 Prospect Theory
Through the years, a number of empirical discrepancies have been 
observed regarding deviations from what expected utility theory would 
predict as correct behaviour. Many economists have noted problems with 
expected utility theory [Slovic and Lichenstein 1983 p.597]. One of the 
more troublesome discrepancies pertaining to decision theory deals with
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preference reversals. To understand preference reversals, consider a 
person who is confronted with two gambles. The first gamble offers a 
high probability of winning a small amount of money. The second gamble 
consists of a low probability of winning a large amount of money. Even 
though gamble number two is assumed to have a higher monetary 
expectation, most people choose the first gamble. It seems that a near 
certain outcome outweighs a larger expected monetary reward. This 
decision contradicts ... ’’almost all theories of preference, including 
the expected utility theorem” [Slovic and Lichenstein 1983 p.596].
Most economists who have worked on this problem feel that the 
reason people are making choices which are not compatible with expected 
utility theory is that the experiments themselves are poorly designed 
[Reilly 1982 and Grether and Platt 1979]. However, Slovic and 
Lichenstein believe: ’’Reversals are not an isolated phenomenon but one
of a large class of findings that demonstrate violations of preference 
models” [Slovic and Lichenstein 1983 p.567]. They feel that it would be 
worthwhile to look at new proposals or theories as well as fine tuning 
experiments to test the existing theory.
Kahneman and Tversky have described several classes of problems 
concerning decisions, both hypothetical and real i.e., involving sums of 
cash, in which preference decisions systematically violate the axioms of 
expected utility theory [Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1982, and 1984]. 
The lack of explanatory power for real events led Kahneman and Tversky 
to propose an alternative idea called prospect theory. Many of prospect 
theories assumptions contradict the assumptions of expected utility.
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Prospect Theory: How Decisions are Analyzed
When people are faced with a decision involving uncertain outcomes, 
how do they decide? It has been assumed in theories of rational 
decision making that people take a comprehensive look at the outcomes 
and are cognizant of the effects on their total welfare. For example, 
it is assumed that people perceive an even bet for ten dollars as a 
choice between no change in total wealth or an even chance to increase 
or decrease total wealth by ten dollars [Kahneman and Tversky 1984].
According to prospect theory, people adopt a limited view of the 
outcomes of decisions; they identify potential outcomes merely as gains 
or losses relative to a neutral point. The limited view point which is 
assumed in this theory recognizes the fact that people in general do not 
have the time or information to make comprehensive decisions.
Concerning prospect theory, two phases of cognitive activity are 
distinguishedv when a choice is contemplated: an editing and an
evaluation phase. The editing phase consists of simplifying or 
organizing and reformulating the available options. This stage 
transforms the outcomes and probabilities associated with the decision 
into terms of gains, losses, and the maintenance of the status quo, 
instead of the presently accepted theory of changes in states of wealth.
Some editing operations appear to prevent or inhibit the organizing 
and reformulating of other options. This can result in inconsistent 
decisions, based upon what part of the decision is edited first, which 
in turn is a function of how the initial problem is framed [Kahneman and
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Tversky 1979 p.274]. Framing deals with the way a decision is
formulated in words. Decisions may be phrased so that a person
perceives his choice to be either a gain or a loss.
Decision Weights
The evaluation phase consists of analyzing the edited information 
and choosing the outcome with the highest utility. The outcomes are 
measured values of the gains and losses. Each edited outcome has a 
probability of occurrence. Attached to these probabilities are decision 
weights. These decision weights are assumed to be nonlinear and reflect* 
the impact of each probability on the overall value of the prospect. 
The slope of a decision weight function can be perceived as a measure of 
the sensitivity of preferences to changes in probability.
These nonlinear decision weights reflect the phenomenon of 
individuals putting different emphases on probabilities. This reflects 
the common perception that most people would pay more to improve their 
chances of winning from 90 percent to certainty than they would to raise 
their chances from 40 to 50 percent. It is also argued that an increase
from impossibility to 10 percent is more significant than an increase
from 30 to 40 percent [Kahneman and Tversky 1982 p.164].
Kahneman and Tversky theorize that moderate and high probabilities 
are underweighted relative to sure things. This contributes to risk 
aversion in gains by reducing the attractiveness of gambles and 
contributes to risk seeking in losses by diminishing the aversiveness of 
negative gambles. Conversely, low probabilities are overweighted
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resulting in an enhancement of small probability wagers and amplifies 
the aversiveness of a small chance of a severe loss [Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984 p.3^5]. Implicit to these assumptions is the hypothesis 
that outcomes which are obtained with certainty are over weighted 
relative to uncertain outcomes. The idea that people evaluate various 
levels of probability differently and in the above manner seems to 
explain the problem of preference reversals.
Value Curve
The assumption that people generally react toward a decision in a 
risk averse manner has been widely held by economists. In contrast, 
psychological studies have shown that risk seeking preferences are 
common when people must choose between a sure loss and a substantial 
probability of a larger loss [Kahneman and Tversky 1982 p.160]. These 
studies, which have encompassed both hypothetical and real situations in 
many different areas, led the authors to propose that preferences 
between gains are risk averse and preferences between losses are risk 
seeking. This gives rise to a decision making function which differs 
from the function which is associated with expected utility theory. For 
an example of this "new" type of decision making function see figure 
2-5. These functions relate subjective values (on the vertical axis) to 
objective outcomes such as money (on the horizontal axis). In prospect 
theory, a concave, convex downward decision making function is present 
as opposed to a concave function which occurs in expected utility 
theory.
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The concave section of the function is for gains, showing that for 
each extra dollar gained there is less value accrued than there was from 
the previous dollar. This conveys the impression that, "the difference 
between a gain of $100 and one of $200 is more significant than the 
difference between a gain of $1100 and one $1200" [Kahneman and Tversky 
1982 p.162]. Concavity favors risk aversion.
Risk seeking is represented in the convex portion of the value
function and under the domain of perceived losses. Convexity
illustrates the assumption that each dollar lost causes a smaller change 
in value than the preceding one, up to an amount that would be viewed as 
a catastrophic loss. This is in accord with the common perception that 
the difference between a loss of $100 and one of $200 is more 
significant than the difference between a loss of $1100 and $1200.
An important part of prospect theory as it pertains to this paper 
is the shape of the decision making function. A common sense assumption 
with great import is that a loss of X dollars is viewed much more
adversely than an equivalent gain is viewed positively. This is called 
loss aversion. For example, Kahneman and Tversky conducted a study 
which showed that participation in a fair bet in which an individual has 
the possibility of losing $10 would be unacceptable unless there was the 
possibility to win at least $30 [Kahneman and Tversky 1982 p.342]. The 
asymmetry of the decision function in relating objectively equivalent 
gains and losses is illustrated in the greater steepness of the value 
function for losses. In figure 2-5 the distances AN and NB denote an
equivalent (in monetary terms) loss and gain, respectively. However,
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because of the shape of the value curve, note the disparity between the 
two measures of utility, NC and ND.
In summary, the value function has three attributes that are 
ascribed to it, each with important ramifications. They are: 1) the 
function is based upon analyzing how people react to perceived gains or 
losses, relative to a neutral point, not to total wealth; 2) people are 
usually risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses which results 
in a function that is concave for gains and convex for losses; 3) the 
convex portion of the function is considerably steeper than the concave 
portion, reflecting loss aversion, which means that people view a loss 
more significantly than they do an equivalent gain.
An example of the effects of framing and the greater steepness for 
losses on the decision function can be seen by observing gas stations 
and their "discounts” for cash payments. Thaler in Kahneman and Tversky 
noted: ’’lobbyists for the credit card industry insisted that any price
difference between cash and credit purchases be labeled cash discount 
rather than a credit card surcharge. The two labels frame the price 
difference as a gain or as a loss by implicitly designating either the 
lower or the higher price as normal. Because losses loom larger than 
gains, consumers were less likely to accept a surcharge than to forego a 
discount” [Kahneman and Tversky 1984 p.346].
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A few examples will help to clarify the major concepts of prospect 
theory. Assume that an individual is confronted with two choices. This 
person must choose between a 99 percent chance of winning $10.00 and a 
60 percent chance of winning $20.00. The latter choice has the highest 
expected monetary value and the individual is expected to choose this 
decision. However, when decision weights are considered, it is possible 
that an individual might choose the former choice. This would be the 
case if the individual's decision weight for the near certain outcome 
was sufficiently large enough in comparison to the decision weight 
placed upon the 60 percent outcome. For example, if the individuals' 
decision weight for the 99 percent chance of winning $10.00 is one and 
the decision weight for the 60 percent chance of winning $20.00 is .7, 
the former choice would be chosen.
The following example clarifies the impact which framing bias and 
the value curve have on decision making and the two measures of 
consumer's surplus. There are at least two ways of framing a question: 
from a gain or a loss perspective. In this example, assume that the 
individual is not satiated with the good. It is assumed in prospect 
theory that if an individual is confronted with the decision: What is
the maximum amount of money would you be willing to pay to be able to 
consume good X, given that X's price has just been decreased relative to 
all other prices? This question is framed as a gain; the individual 
has the opportunity of consuming the same amount or more of X at the 
lower price. Alternatively, if the individual is confronted with the 
decision: What is the minimum amount of money that you would accept to
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forego the opportunity of consuming good X at the lower price level, 
they would be faced with a question framed as a loss. In accord with 
the value curve and the loss aversion principle, the latter question 
will elicit a higher dollar amount. This is because of the hypothesis 
that individuals require more compensation when confronted with a 
potential loss then they do when they are confronted with an objectively 
equivalent potential gain. Readers should note that the above two 
questions mirror the definitions of compensating and equivalent 
variation that were given earlier in this chapter. Thus, prospect 
theory presents a viable hypothesis as to why compensating and 
equivalent variation differ when empirically measured. This concept 
will be explored further in the following section.
2.6 Prospect Theory and Consumer's Surplus
The value function and all of its associated implications have not 
been put forth as a universal law of individuals' behaviour. It is 
presented as a summary of aggregate behaviour under uncertainty. The 
implications of prospect theory on the empirical discrepancy between 
equivalent and compensating variation are shown. It is assumed that 
prospect theory is valid in the aggregate. However, this does not 
imply: 1) The convexity changes of an individuals' value curve are
uniform across all individuals; or 2) The neutral point from which 
decisions are made is uniform across individuals.
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To reiterate the problem which this paper is concerned: a person
who uses a particular fishing site is asked two questions. First, what 
is the maximum amount they would be willing to pay to continue to use 
this spot and second, what is the minimum amount they would accept as 
payment to forego the use of the site. According to economic theory, 
the two measures of value, compensating and equivalent variation 
respectively, should be nearly equal with any small discrepancy due to 
income effects. However, empirical analysis has shown that there is a 
large difference between the two measures. In many studies, equivalent 
variation has differred from compensating variation by four to twenty 
times.
If we look at the above questions objectively or in terms of total 
wealth changes, the two questions should elicit equal answers. Assume 
that the fishing site has a fixed market value and each outcome has an 
equal opportunity of occurring. In both cases it is a simple trade off 
between goods. For example, if you would trade one orange for two 
apples, you would also be willing to trade two apples for one orange and 
suffer no loss of welfare, at least for one exchange.
It is proposed that prospect theory offers an explanation as to why 
the two measures of value differ. With prospect theory, we would 
analyze the problem differently. When confronted with the two 
questions, we would view them as a possible gain or a possible loss of 
land respectively. Even though the market has fixed the price of the 
fishing site i.e., the gain and the loss of the site in monetary terms 
are equal, prospect theory states that people view a loss more adversely
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than they do an equivalent gain. The phenomenon of loss aversion 
results in a higher negative value of the loss of the site than the 
positive value associated with the use of the site.
If people view the loss more adversely, it makes sense that they 
demand a higher level of compensation to make them feel as well off. 
The degree of compensation is a function of the steepness of the risk 
seeking portion of the curve relative to the slope of the risk averse 
part of the curve. The more a person behaves in a loss averse manner 
the steeper the risk seeking portion of the curve becomes. Therefore, 
it would seem the greater the difference in slopes between the risk 
averse and risk seeking segments of the curve, the greater the 
difference between compensating and equivalent variation.
The question of why people view a loss so much stronger than an 
equivalent gain is just beginning to be explored. Knetsch is working on 
a perspective that people over emphasize the possession of property 
rights. Thaler has coined a term, the endowment effect, to acknowledge 
this behaviour [Kahneman and Tversky 1984 p.348].
While prospect theory is in its infancy, it is believed that using 
this theory to interpret individuals’ behaviour explains at least some 
of the variation in the two measures of value. This type of analysis 
has been shown to correctly predict behaviour in some recent studies. 
In the domain of economics, Fishburn and Kochenberger [1979] analyzed 
thirty empirically assessed utility functions which were derived from 
five different sources. These functions dealt with changes in wealth.
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After finding mathematical functions to fit the data, they found that 
most utility functions for gains were concave, most utility functions 
for losses were convex, and only three cases showed risk aversion for 
both gains and losses. Most important for my analysis, with only a 
single exception, utility functions were considerably steeper for losses 
than for gains.
As far as I have been able to ascertain, there has been no study to 
date which has attempted to test the effectiveness of prospect theory in 
allaying the problems associated with the measurement of compensating 
and equivalent variation. In the following chapter an empirical study 
is outlined. This study is undertaken in an attempt to test the 
effectiveness of prospect theory in explaining some of the disparity 
which is associated with the two measurements of consumers surplus.
CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND FOR THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
It is proposed that compensating variation differs from equivalent 
variation because of the failure of a hypothesis within decision theory. 
This hypothesis is known as invariance. Kahneman and Tversky [1984] 
first mentioned this in a paper which considered the way individuals 
make decisions in risky and riskless contexts.
Invariance can be perceived as a rule which requires that a 
person's preference ordering of outcomes not be a function of the way in 
which they are described. In other words, two options which are 
equivalent when shown together should elicit the same preference when 
shown separately [Kahneman and Tversky 1984 p.3431* For example, when 
patients are confronted with a choice on whether to have an operation or 
not, their decision depends upon how the question is poised. If they 
are told they have a 70 percent chance of living through the operation 
they are more inclined to proceed with the operation than if they are 
told that they have a 30 percent chance of dying [Kahneman and Tversky 
1984].
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In prospect theory, it is proposed that individuals make decisions 
based on how the problem is presented to them; i.e., they make a 
decision based on whether they perceive the decision to involve a gain 
or a loss. If this hypothesis is correct, it means that the hypothesis 
of invariance is not compatible with the way individuals make decisions. 
Investigating the validity of the invariance hypothesis is the focus of 
the empirical portion of this paper.
Kahneman and Tversky state that the failure of invariance has two 
causes: framing bias and decision weights. In numerous empirical
experiments, both framing bias and decision weights have been shown to 
invalidate the hypothesis of invariance [Kahneman and Tversky 1984]. 
These experiments presented individuals with choices involving varying 
levels of probability of occurrence and with varying outcomes.
This paper is going to test the validity of these hypotheses within 
the framework of an economic survey involving compensating and 
equivalent variation. This economic study entails interviewing a set 
number of respondents with a questionnaire designed to elicit 
information regarding framing bias and decision weights. Before delving 
into this empirical model, it is necessary to explain the two causes.
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3.2 The Hypotheses
Framing Bias
Framing bias refers to the phenomenon of phrasing objectively 
equivalent questions in such a manner that the answers which are 
elicited differ. By objectively equivalent I will be referring to 
expected monetary outcomes. This does not have to be the case, however. 
For example, a decision is made to use an antidote to cure an outbreak 
of a fatal disease. It will result in a recovery rate of 40 percent. 
This statement may also be phrased in the following manner: the use of
the antidote will result in a 60 percent death rate. These two 
statements are also viewed as being objectively equivalent.
To have framing bias, there must be a reference point from which 
the decision is being analyzed. For example, a decision can be framed 
as either a gain, loss, or a maintenance of the status quo, with 
differring answers expected depending upon which reference point is 
used. This difference is due to the belief that an individual places a 
higher value on a gamble involving a perceived loss than they do on a 
perceived gamble involving an equivalent gain.
An outcome may also be framed so that asset positions which 
incorporate initial wealth into the decision making process are used as 
the reference point for deciding the outcome. The decision is based on 
whether the outcome is a gain or loss in accord with the assets which 
the individual possesses. This is the current position which economic
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theory takes [Kahneman and Tversky 1984].
In empirical tests, Kahneman and Tversky have found the phenomenon 
of framing bias to be both: "pervasive and robust, as common among
sophisticated respondents as among naive ones" [Kahneman and Tversky 
1984 p.343].
Decision Weights
Most studies which combine probability and cardinal utility 
analysis use, in some manner, expected utility analysis. This method 
dates back to Bernoulli. Studies which use von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's analysis incorporate expected utility into their analysis. 
See for example Green's [1961] and Swalm's [1966] studies where they 
derived utility functions of businessmen. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's 
analysis concerning expected utility theory gives unique utility 
measures up to an arbitrary linear transformation.
Kahneman and Tversky put forth the hypothesis that this value is 
not a linear function of the probability of an outcome [Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984]. Instead, they came up with a weighting function which is 
dependent upon probability but not in a linear fashion. For example, 
they surmise that an increase in the probability of an event occurring 
from zero percent to five percent has a greater impact upon the value of 
an outcome than does an increase from 35 percent to 40 percent. They 
also believe that an increase from 95 percent to 100 percent has a 
greater impact than does the zero percent to five percent.
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Kahneman and Tversky derived a hypothetical curve for an individual 
which plots the decision weight attached to an outcome as a function of 
its probability. See figure 3-1• This curve, except for the endpoints, 
illustrates that an increase in the probability of the outcome occurring 
raises the value of the outcome by less than the respective increase.
3.3 Empirical Framework
Background
In Missoula, Montana, until mid 1983, Rattlesnake Creek and wells 
were the only sources of water. Depending upon the location within the 
city, individuals could consume either of the two possibilities. It was 
also possible that during certain months of the year Rattlesnake water 
consumers would be switched to well water. This would occur during 
times of high turbidity, extremely cold temperatures, or very low water 
levels. During the summer of 1983» Giardia was found in the Rattlesnake 
water supply. This resulted in the entire city being hooked up to well 
water.
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Since well water has become the sole source of water, there have 
been complaints about the hardness of the water. Missoula's well water 
has been tested and found to be seven times as hard as Rattlesnake 
water. Hardness can be measured by the amount of minerals (measured in 
parts per million), in the water. The most common minerals found in 
Missoula's water supply are calcium carbonate and magnesium. The harder 
water results in deposits building up in items such as faucets, pipes, 
and dish washers. For some home owners this problem has necessitated 
the purchase of water softeners. In conversations with store managers 
which sell water softeners, they mentioned a definite rise in the sales 
of this product since the summer of 1983*
Several studies have been completed which detail the economic costs 
of a new water treatment plant. This would enable Rattlesnake water to 
be consumed once again. One study, funded by the Mountain Water 
Company, found that the annuity required to fund the treatment plant 
plus operating and maintenance costs for a 50 year time period was 
approximately $767,230.00 per year [Park Water Co. Memorandum 1984].
Objectives of Analysis
The empirical analysis focuses on three objectives. The first 
objective is to derive an empirical estimate of the average dollar value 
placed upon Rattlesnake drinking water by Missoula's water consumers. 
Both compensating and equivalent variation dollar values will be 
measured. The second objective is to check for framing bias. If it is 
found to be present, its effect upon the two measures of value will be
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studied. The last objective is to build a decision weight function and 
find out how the probabilities are weighted.
Dollar estimates of compensating and equivalent variation will be 
derived for three reasons. Their values will indicate what the 
preference is toward consuming Rattlesnake water which in turn reflects 
the respondents' attitudes toward building a water treatment plant. 
However, it should be noted that this is not a measure of the total 
benefits which would be derived from the installation of a treatment 
plant. The second reason is to find out what variables influence the 
two measures of value. The third reason is to find out what type of 
relationship exists between the two measures of value. For example, 
this study will determine if one value is greater than or equal to the 
other. In other words, do these values correspond to each other in the 
way economic theory dictates or do they follow the relationship which 
has developed in similar economic studies.
The second objective is concerned with framing bias. The relevant 
questions are formulated so that it will be possible to detect if the 
hypothesis of invariance is broken. This is accomplished by 
deliberately framing a decision problem in more than one way. If 
framing bias is found to be present, it will give credence to Kahneman 
and Tversky's assertion that outcomes may be manipulated, "without 
distorting or suppressing information, merely by the framing of outcomes 
and contingencies" [Kahneman and Tversky 1984 p.346].
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In this study compensating variation is the variable manipulated. 
It is framed from both a gain and a loss perspective. The questions 
which elicit the compensating variation and frame responses are shown 
below.
4) Assume that it would be possible to consume Rattlesnake 
water if a water treatment plant is built. What is the 
maximum amount which you would be willing to have added on to 
to have added on to your existing monthly water bill to give 
you the opportunity to be able to consume Rattlesnake rather 
than well water?
6) Imagine that you are currently consuming Rattlesnake 
water and the water company issues a report which states that 
they will be forced to shut off Rattlesnake water next month 
due to high costs unless consumers would be willing to pay 
higher water bills. What is the maximum increase in your 
monthly water bill that you would allow in order that you 
continue the Rattlesnake water service?
Both questions refer to a hypothetical situation. In question four 
the consumer is asked to pay when the reference point is perceived to be 
a gain. Question six is framed so that the consumer is asked to pay 
when the reference point is perceived to be a prevention of a loss.
The hypothesis that risk plays a role in the disparity between 
compensating and equivalent variation will be tested by the decision 
weight function. The goal of this objective is to find out how the 
value of drinking Rattlesnake water changes as the probability or risk 
of depleting Missoula's acquifer is varied. Two functions will be 
derived, one for each measure of value. Of major interest will be 
determining if there is nonlinearity within either of the decision 
weight functions. Also, the two functions will be compared to see how
53
they relate to one another. This decision weight function may also 
indicate that the hypothesis of invariance does not work under normal 
conditions of human decision making.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire was designed to derive the data necessary to 
satisfy the three objectives. Appendix A contains more detailed 
information about the questionaire. Questions numbered one, two, three, 
four, seven, eleven, and twelve all identify potential independent 
variables that could have an impact upon either an equivalent or 
compensating valuation value. Using both equivalent and compensating 
variation as the dependent variables, an explanatory equation will be 
derived with the above questions as the independent variables. This 
equation will be derived using regression analysis.
Question number four measures compensating variation and number 
eight measures equivalent variation. These questions do not have the 
variable risk added explicitly. Questions nine and ten ask equivalent 
and compensated variation values, respectively. These two questions do 
have various risk components explicitly included.
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Sampling Procedures
Three problems surfaced when the questionnaire was distributed. 
The first problem dealt with who was going to receive the questionnaire 
while the second problem involved finding a proper sample size. The 
third problem was how to obtain a sample that was random.
It was decided to constrain the population to the boundaries of 
Missoula with three exceptions. The upper portions of the Rattlesnake 
which are not within the city limits but which are serviced by Mountain 
Water Company were included in the population. The area of the South 
Hills which is bounded by 39th Street, Highland Park, and 25th Avenue 
was excluded from the sample. This was because many of the residences 
have their own water supplies. It is believed that the best sample 
would include only those who purchased water from Mountain Water 
Company. The third problem dealt with the area West of Reserve Street. 
Portions of this area are within the city limits and are serviced by 
Mountain Water Company but they were excluded because of problems of 
attaining a random sample. This problem concerned the farms which 
encompassed very large areas. This would have resulted in this area 
having a disproportionate effect upon the sample. In order to maintain 
the assumption of land area being a proxy for population percentages, 
the decision was made to exclude this area. Being constrained by 
limited resources such as money and time, it was felt that the 
assumption of transposing the percentage of geographical area into an 
equal percentage of consumers is realistic.
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Once the area of the sample was defined, it had to be determined 
who within a chosen residence was eligible to answer the survey. It was 
decided that an individual would be acceptable only if he or she was 
intimately involved with the payment of bills for the household. It was 
felt that a person who was familiar with the dollar amounts of utility 
bills, in particular the water bill, was more desirable. This was 
important because an iterative bidding device for the equivalent and 
compensating variation was not used. The individuals' water bill was 
intended to give them some sort of framework from which to give a bid. 
The second reason was to acquire a more sophisticated response in all 
aspects of the questionnaire.
In choosing a sample size, the main criteria was that the sample 
was large enough to be able to apply statistical analysis. This study 
was not concerned with making the analysis policy defensible. This 
would require a sample size larger than the one which was chosen. 
Statistical theory states that if the sample size is greater than or 
equal to 30 the sample estimate of the variance is a good approximation 
to the unknown population variance [Koutsoyiannis 19771. It was decided 
to give 35 interviews, giving an error margin of five.
In delivering the questionnaire, the second problem that was 
encountered concerned the derivation of a sample that was random. 
Geographically, approximately 60 percent of Missoula was on the 
Rattlesnake water system. The assumption was made that this 
geographical percentage applies equally to the number of water 
consumers. Thus, for this sample 35 observations were chosen from a
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pooled weighted average which contained the following ratio: 40 percent
of households which live in areas that were unable to consume 
Rattlesnake water and 60 percent of households which lived in areas 
which were able to consume Rattlesnake water.
In the actual derivation of this sample, there were 13 residences 
that were able to consume only well water and 22 residences that were 
able to consume Rattlesnake water. These numbers were compiled from an 
appropriately weighted random numbers table.
After compiling the appropriate ratio of residences which were 
bounded by their respective water capabilities, 13 blocks were chosen 
from within the well water region and 22 blocks were chosen from within 
the Rattlesnake region. The following procedure was used to determine 
which residence to interview on the randomly picked blocks. Starting on 
the North West corner of the chosen block and proceeding in a clock wise 
direction, each residence was counted and recorded numerically on a slip 
of paper. After counting the number of residences on the block the 
numbers were placed in a box and one was picked at random.
If the individual at the chosen residence refused to be 
interviewed, the random draw was repeated for the same block. If no one 
was home at the chosen residence, the address was recorded and an 
attempt was made at a later date. If this later attempt also failed, 
another residence was chosen from the same block in the above manner.
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Another problem which occurred was when the chosen site turned out 
to be a commercial venture. When this happened, a new site was picked 
or in the case of the entire block being commercial, a new random block 
was chosen from the same region. Residences were also encountered which 
contained individuals who were recent arrivals in Missoula. It was 
decided to interview them anyway on the grounds that they would still be 
able to express a preference.
It is possible that the small sample size of this study can lead to 
a distorted statistical analysis. However, the objective of this study 
is to design a small scale experiment which tests a particular solution 
to an important economic anomaly. If the empirical analysis from this 
study gives credence to the hypotheses which are being analyzed, a more 
in depth empirical analysis should be carried out.
It is felt that any error which results from the above assumptions 
will be very small, especially in respect to the direction which this 
study takes. If this study is random, it will also be free of bias, 
which is the position taken with the statistical analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
4.1 Introduction
This chapter contains the statistical analysis for this paper. 
There are four sections, each one dealing with a specific area. The 
second section analyzes compensating and equivalent variation plus 
framing bias. These variables do not have risk included. Their values 
are tested to make sure they are significantly different from zero. 
This section also deals with compensating and equivalent variation 
values which have varying levels of risk explicitly added. The mean 
values are calculated for all of the risk levels. The means are then 
compared and tested for significance.
In sections three and four, the variation in compensating and 
equivalent variation values are observed as an added variable - risk - 
is added to the analysis. The third section is concerned with the 
calculation of these risk varied values. A decision weight function is 
derived in the fourth section. This section builds a function and 
calculates the associated probability weights for each value of risk. 
It will show if the various risk levels have weights that result in 
either under or overweighting outcomes. Section five is concerned with 
the analysis of the interrelationships between the independent and the 
dependent variables. The technique of regression analysis was
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originally going to be used. However, due to the large amount of 
heteroscedasticity which was found to exist within the explanatory 
variables, the technique of factor analysis was finally employed.
4.2: Significance of the Variables WTP, WTS, and FRAME
The variables WTP, WTS, and FRAME measure compensating variation, 
equivalent variation and framing bias, respectively. The variable WTP 
measures the maximum dollar figure which the people from this sample 
would be willing to pay in the form of increased water bills in order to 
obtain the use of Rattlesnake drinking water. The average or mean 
dollar figure is $2.80 with a standard error of 0.611 . Using the 
statistic student's T, this mean figure is statistically significant or 
different from zero at the 0.999 confidence level. This was calculated 
using a two tailed test with 32 observations.
The variable WTS measures the minimum dollar amount which consumers 
from the sample felt was necessary to compensate them for not being able 
to consume Rattlesnake water. This amount was to be deducted from their 
water bill. The mean value is $6.40 with a standard error of 1.71 . 
The WTS mean is statistically different from zero at the 0.999 
confidence level and was calculated using a two tailed test with 32 
observations.
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The variable FRAME was inserted into the questionnaire to ascertain 
whether or not two questions (which in objective terms requested 
equivalent payments) would elicit different amounts based upon the way 
the question was framed. The mean bid was $4.09 with a standard error 
of 0.854 . Calculated using a two tailed test with 32 observations, 
this mean is also statistically different from zero at the 0.999 
confidence interval.
Relationships Between WTP, WTS, and FRAME
I was interested in the relationships between the three variables. 
Specifically, I wanted to determine if any statistical difference 
between the three means existed or whether the variations within the 
means were due to the randomness of the experiment. The null hypothesis 
in all of the statistical tests below is: no difference between the
means or the difference between the means is equal to zero. A correct 
statistical procedure to test this hypothesis is paired samples which 
uses the student T [Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1977 p.216], Paired samples 
is a test that is appropriate for variables which are not independent of 
one another. The results discussed below are summarized in table 4-1.
In comparing WTS and WTP, economic theory states that the null 
hypothesis should be accepted. My results turned out contrary to 
economic theory. At the 97.6 percent level of confidence, the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the means is rejected. The 
confidence interval was between 0.0037 and 7.199 . The possibility that 
the two means are equal seems implausible because the null hypothesis
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falls outside this interval.
In objective terras, the variables WTP and FRAME should measure the 
same dollar amount. As a result, it is expected that the null 
hypothesis should be accepted. At the 97.9 percent level of confidence 
the null hypothesis of no difference between the means is rejected. 
This confidence interval lies between 0.0018 and 2.567 . This resul
implies that it is highly improbable that the two means are equal which 
in turn gives credence to the issue of framing bias. It should be noted 
that in this study the variable which is associated with the framing 
loss, FRAME, has a larger mean than the one associated with a framing 
gain, WTP.
Table 4-1: Paired T Tests for the Variables WTP, WTS, and FRAME
(DIFFERENCE) STANDARD T 2-TAIL
VARIABLE MEANS MEANS ERROR VALUE PR0B.
WTS
WTP
6.4006
2.8041
3.5966 1.516 2.37 .024
FRAME
WTP
4.0884
2.8041
1.2844 .530 2.42 .021
WTS
FRAME
6.4006
4.0884
2.3122 1.483 1.56 .129
calculated with 32 observations
62
Since the preceding test has shown an influence that may be 
attributable to framing bias, an interesting test would be to examine 
the statistical difference between the variables WTS and FRAME. Both 
variables are framed as losses. But, in the former payments are 
received and in the latter payments are made. With this analysis, the 
null hypothesis of no difference between the two means is accepted at 
the 88 percent confidence level. It is not until the 87 percent 
confidence level that the null hypothesis could be rejected. The 
confidence interval is between 0.00028 and 4.62412 .
Outliers
In analyzing the data for the three variables, WTS had one outlier 
which was for $50.00. This outlier was 4.7 standard deviations from the 
mean. The next highest value was for $20.00 which was 1.4 standard 
deviations from the mean. It was decided to retest the relationships 
between WTP and WTS, and between WTS and FRAME with the seventeenth case 
from the Rattlesnake region (the $20.00 value) deleted from the data.
The affect on the variable WTS was to lower the standard error by 
nearly double the percentage that the mean was lowered. The standard 
error declined by 41 percent while the mean declined by 22 percent. The 
null hypothesis of no difference between the means of WTS and WTP was 
rejected at the 99*5 percent confidence level. This resulted in an 
increase in the confidence interval by 1.9 percent. The null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between the means of the variables WTS and 
FRAME was rejected at the 93-2 percent confidence level. This results
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in a higher confidence level by 6.2 percent.
4.3 Equivalent and Compensating Variation With Risk 
Introduction
This segment of my analysis pertains to deriving empirical 
estimates of compensating and equivalent variation with the added 
component of risk. This analysis is divided into two objectives. The 
first objective is concerned with the comparison of compensating and 
equivalent variation values to each other when various risk 
possibilities are introduced. The second objective is to build a 
decision weight function. It is shown how the value of Rattlesnake 
water changes as various probabilities of acquifer depletion are 
introduced. In particular, this study is interested in the type of 
relationship or function that is developed between varying gradations of 
risk and their accompanying bids.
Values With Risk Explicit
In the questionnaire, questions numbered nine and ten respectively, 
derive equivalent and compensating values for Rattlesnake water. These 
two questions will be referred to as RWTS and RWTP. These questions ask 
for separate values which correspond to different levels of risk of 
acquifer depletion. The values of risk vary between 10 and 100 percent 
with 10 percentage point iterations.
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The mean values were calculated for equivalent and compensating 
variation at the ten different probability levels (see table 4-2). The 
RWTP mean was calculated using 31 observations and the RWTS mean was 
calculated using 29 observations. The decrease in observations between 
these mean bids and the mean bids associated with WTP and WTS was due to 
nonresponse answers. Individuals found the questions which involved bid 
iterations much more difficult to answer.
The compensating variation value for a ten percent chance of
acquifer depletion is $3*15. Comparing this figure with the 
compensating variation value of $2.80 which was derived within a 
riskless context gives credence to both figures. Apparently, a ten 
percent chance of acquifer depletion does not have a large affect upon 
the welfare of the respondents. An additional charge of $0.35 per month 
in their water bills gives them the same level of welfare as the
scenario when there was no mention of risk.
However, there is a curious outcome involving the initial 
equivalent variation values. The risk induced value of 10 percent is 
less than the value without risk and the 20 percent figure is just 
equal. This implies that the respondents require less compensation if
there is a very small chance of depleting the acquifer as opposed to the
question which does not mention the problem of acquifer depletion.
I believe that there may be a plausible explanation for this 
discrepancy. Respondents may carry some information into the interview 
process which makes them feel that, in real life, there is a twenty
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percent chance of the acquifer being depleted. This phenomenon has been 
referred to in the literature as information bias. The reason that this 
does not affect compensating variation could be due to self interest on 
the respondents behalf.
Comparison of Equivalent and Compensating Means
The equivalent and compensating bids are compared using two 
different techniques. In one case the means for both categories were 
computed at each risk level. To determine if the mean values with equal 
risk of compensating and equivalent variation were different from one 
another, the paired T sample test was used. In all of these tests the 
null hypothesis that was tested was; no difference between the two 
means. The results are in table 4-2. Two points should be observed. 
All of the paired means are statistically significant or different from 
zero by at least the 90 percent confidence level. The statistical 
significance increased after the 30 percent chance of acquifer depletion 
to the 99 percent level. It stayed at that level throughout the rest of 
the variations of risk. These mean bids are illustrated in figure 4-1 .
The other point that should be noted is that the difference between 
the respective means grows larger for each successive risk level. This 
difference is calculated in the following manner. The change from 10 to 
20 percent is plotted at the twenty percent level of risk. The change 
from 20 to 30 percent is plotted at thirty percent. This method is 
followed throughout.
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The difference between mean bids behaves in an oscillating manner 
up until the eighty percent value for compensating variation and the 
seventy percent value for equivalent variation. These differences in 
values may be observed in figure 4-2 .
Outliers
In studying the data, case number 22 from the Rattlesnake area has 
the largest standard deviations from its' means. This is for both 
compensating and equivalent variation. There are 13 outliers which are 
greater than or equal to four standard deviations to their respective 
means. Case number 22 provides 11 of these outliers. This case was 
removed and the T samples were run again. The two-tailed probabilities 
do not change for any of the risk levels. However, the mean values are 
substantially lowered. See figure 4-3*
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Table 4-2: Paired T Tests for Variables with Risk
(DIFFERENCE) STD T 2-TAIL 
% VARIABLE MEAN MEAN ERROR VALUE PROB
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20
•
Equivalent
Compensating
. 6.402 . 
! 3-975 I
2.427 . .887 . 2.74 . .01
30
•
Equivalent
Compensating
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! 4.386 .’
3.575 ! 1.352 ! 2.64 ; .013
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. 10.712 . 
*. 6.423 *•
4.288 ! 1.389 ! 3.09 .* .004
50
•
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calculated with 29 observations
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Figure 4-1:
COMPENSATING AND EQUIVALENT VARIATION
Mean Bids With Risk Included
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Figure 4 -2 :
COMPENSATING AND EQUIVALENT VARIATION WITH RISK
Dollar Differences
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COMPENSATING AND EQUIVALENT VARIATION
Mean Bids Without Outlier
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4.4 Deriving a Decision Weight Function
Introduction
This segment of the empirical analysis is concerned with the 
building of a decision weight function. It is designed to provide 
insight into the way individuals’ dollar values change as probabilities 
of acquifer depletion or risk levels are varied.
This function is developed in an attempt to illuminate three areas. 
They are: (1) to find out if a linear and equivalent relationship
exists between decision weights and their respective risk levels 
i.e.,find out if all decisions have an equal decision weight; (2) if a 
nonlinear relationship is found, to find out how the respective 
probabilities are weighted; and (3) to compare the derived value curve 
derived from this study with the hypothetical value curve in Kahneman 
and Tversky [1934].
Relationship between Bids and Risk
In checking for linearity, mean bids are calculated for equivalent 
and compensating variation at each probability level. To derive a 
decision weight function, the percentage change between mean bids from 
one risk level to another have to be calculated. The percentage changes 
are calculated in the following manner. As an example: to derive the
percentage change from 10 percent to 20 percent the mean bid figure at 
the 20 percent risk level is divided by the mean bid figure at the 10 
percent level. This percentage is then plotted at the 20 percent risk
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level. This method is used for all of the cases.
Originally, the mean bids associated with a zero percent chance of 
acquifer depletion were to be taken from questions numbered four and 
eight. These two questions refer to compensating and equivalent 
variation without the component of risk. As previously noted, the value 
for equivalent variation with a 10 percent level of risk is less than 
the value without any risk. The discrepancy between these bids led to 
the exclusion of the case which would have been derived from the risk 
level being changed to 10 percent from zero percent. Thus, the first 
point which is graphed in figure 4-4 is the percentage change in dollar 
bids when risk is varied from 10 to 20 percent.
If linearity is present between the decision weights, the graphing 
of these percentage changes with their respective risk levels would lead 
to a shape which is a reasonable facsimile of an indifference curve. 
The first derivative of acquifer depletion with respect to changes in 
bid levels should be negative throughout the function. The second 
derivative should be positive i.e., the function should be convex to the 
origin. In looking at figure 4-4 and table 4-3, the graph and the data 
do not indicate convexity. Figure 4-4 shows that the functions behave 
in a cyclical fashion.
The values in Table 4-3 are calculated in the following manner. 
The assumption was made that monetary outcomes are an expression for 
utility. Thus, for compensating variation, $19.75 is a measure of the 
total utility associated with a 100 percent chance of acquifer
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depletion. If a linear relation associated with 10 percentage point 
increments was present, the dollar value of a 40 percent chance of 
acquifer depletion would be $7.90. This linear relationship was not 
found with any of the risk levels for either compensating or equivalent 
variation.
Probability Weights
In this section the slope of the decision weight function will be 
explored. Of particular interest is the way different probabilities are 
weighted. This is because of their affect on the value of the outcomes. 
For example: if the probability of losing well water is 10 percent, the
value of Rattlesnake Creek water depends upon the weighting function. 
If the probability function is underweighted relative to the linear 
relationship which is dictated by decision theory, then the outcome 
becomes undervalued. However, if the probability function is 
overweighted, the value of the outcome is overvalued.
The previous section presented empirical evidence which showed that 
this probability function was not linear. How are the probabilities 
weighted? A probability function was built to answer this question. 
Remember that the slope of the decision weight function can be perceived 
as a measure of the sensitivity of preferences to changes in 
probabilities.
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Table 4-3: The Amount by which Bids are Underweighted or Overweighted
EQUIVALENT VARIATION COMPENSATING VARIATION
Level of Actual
Level of 
Risk 
(x) Total
Level of 
Risk
.Actual (x) Total
Risk % . Bids $ Utility Difference . Bids $ Utility Different
10 : 4.52 2.89 1.63 . 3.15 . 1.97 1.18
20 : 6.40 5.77 .63 . 3.98 . 3-95 .025
30 : 8.96 8.66 .30 . 5.84 . 5.92 CO
OO0•1•
40 : 10.71 11.54 • 1 • OO U) 1 
1
. 6.42 . 7.90 . -1.477
50 : 13.54 14.43 -.89 . 8.19 . 9.87 . -1.66
60 : 15.10 17.32 - 2 . 2 2 . 9.45 . 11.85 . -2.40
70 : 16.93 20.20 -3.27 . 10.27 . 13.82 • -3.55
80 : 18.95 23.09 -4.14 . 11.94 . 15.80 . -3.86
90 : 21.88 25.98 -4.10 . 14.67 . 17.77 . -3.09
100 : 28.86 28.86 . 19.75
Note: If the difference between the actual bid and the risk
multiplied by total utility is positive, the relevant probability or 
risk level is overweighted. If the difference is negative, the relevant 
probability or risk level is underweighted. As long as there is a 
difference, either positive or negative, there is the implication of 
nonlinear decision weights.
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The Weighting Function
Using expected utility theory, if the utility of having no well 
water is 'X* and the probability of acquifer depletion is *P', then the 
value (for a monetary outcome) is [X*P], In this empirical analysis, 
the dollar representation of utility for 100 percent chance of no well 
water is $28.86 and $19.75 for equivalent and compensating variation, 
respectively. Thus, according to expected utility analysis, a 10 
percent chance of losing well water should result in a utility 
representation of $2.88 using the equivalent variation figure [Kahneman 
and Tversky 1984 p.344]. This line of reasoning is followed for all of 
the risk levels. The points which are calculated in the above manner 
form a linear line with equal weighting for all probabilities.
Plotted against this line are the actual compensating and 
equivalent mean bids which were derived from the questionnaire. These 
plots can be viewed in figures 4-5 and 4-6. In figure 4-5, the 
empirically derived equivalent variation bids are overweighted for 10 
and 20 percent. They are approximately equal at the 30 percent risk 
level. Bids which are associated with a 40 percent or greater chance of 
acquifer depletion are underweighted.
Figure 4-6 shows a similar analysis for compensating variation. 
However, bids are overweighted only at 10 percent, approximately equal 
at 20 percent, and underweighted for risk levels 30 percent or greater.
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These plots Indicate that for the most part, an increase of 10 
percentage points in the probability of acquifer depletion raises the 
utility (in monetary terms) for Rattlesnake Creek by less than 10 
percent. In terms of equivalent variation this implies: for each 10
percentage point increase in the probability of acquifer depletion 
greater than 30 percent, individuals demand less than a 10 percent 
decrease in their water bills in order to forego the use of Rattlesnake 
water. In terms of compensating variation: for each 10 percentage
point increase in the probability of acquifer depletion greater than 20 
percent, individuals are willing to pay less than 10 percent to be able 
to consume Rattlesnake Creek water.
4.5 Analysis of Explanatory Variables
The intent of the regression analysis portion of this study was to 
regress the dependent variables WTP and WTS upon the independent 
variables RESIDENC, RATTLEH2, Y, FUTURE, PREFRNCE, WATER, UTILITYS, and 
YEARS. This was to be done so that an explanatory equation concerning 
what the WTS and WTP bids were based upon, could be built. The 
relationship between the questions from the questionnaire and these 
variable labels is given in table 4-4.
After completing the initial regression analyses, it was found that 
the assumption of homoscedasticity was not satisfied. The term 
homoscedasticity relates to the assumption which states: the variances
of each error term associated with all explanatory variables are
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constant. If this assumption is not satisfied, the offending error 
terms are referred to as heteroscedastic or not constant.
Table 4-4: Variable Labels and their Respective Questions
Question 1 = YEARS 
Question 2 = RATTLEH2
Question 7 = UTILITYS 
Question 8 = WTS 
Question 9 = RWTS 
Question 10 = RWTP 
Question 11 = Y 
Question 12 = PREFRNCE
Question 3 = WATER 
Question 4 = WTP
Question 5 = FUTURE 
Question 6 = FRAME
On a priori grounds it was expected that this study would have a 
small amount of heteroscedasticity. This is because the data which was 
collected for this study is cross sectional. It has been shown that 
there is a high incidence of heteroscedasticity with cross sectional 
data [Koutsoyiannis 1977 p.183]-
There are many different techniques that can be used to detect 
heteroscedasticity. Perhaps the easiest technique is to plot the 
residuals against the predicted values. If heteroscedasticity is 
present, the plot will behave in either one or both of the following 
ways. The plots will disperse at an increasing rate as the predicted 
values increase or, the plots will congregate together at an increasing 
rate. These descriptions refer to increasing variance and decreasing 
variance, respectively.
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For this study, the WTP and WTS variables were regressed upon the 
independent variables. These predictive values were then plotted 
against the residuals. The analyses involving both dependent variables 
showed an increasing variance. This confirms that heteroscedasticity is 
a problem in this analysis.
There are several adverse consequences if the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is violated. One is that the regression method of 
ordinary least squares becomes inefficient. Efficiency refers to the 
property of having minimum variance around the unbiased estimators. 
Another problem pertains to the applicability of common second - order 
tests of the econometric assumptions. The second - order tests consist 
of analyzing the estimates of the parameters for their reliability. 
With the presence of heteroscedasticity, these tests become inapplicable 
[Koutsoyiannis 1977 p.184].
When heteroscedasticity is found to be present, the appropriate 
solution is to transform the offending estimates in such a way that 
these transformed estimates error terms have constant variance. A 
common transformation is to divide through the original relationship by 
the square root of the term responsible for the homoscedasticity 
[Koutsoyiannis 1977 p.188]. of multiplying through the original 
relationship by the natural log.
In this study, five out of the eight independent variables are 
dummy variables. A problem occurs with the transformation process. The 
problem is that dummy variables can not be transformed. The variables
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WTP, WTS, WATER, UTILITYS, and YEARS were multiplied by the natural log 
in an attempt to derive constant variances. After running another set 
of regression analyses, the plots showed that the problem of 
heteroscedasticity had been taken care of. Although there was an R2 of 
0.70, only one out of the eight independent variables was significantly 
different from zero. WATER was the significant variable. This variable 
was regressed by itself. This resulted in a very low R2.
Factor Analysis
Because of the problems associated with the use of regression 
analysis, factor analysis was chosen as a surrogate technique. Factor 
analysis is a multivariate statistical tool. Its function is to take 
variables with a high degree of intercorrelation which are difficult to 
interpret, and create new hypothetical variables called factors that are 
relatively independent and easier to interpret. See appendix B for a 
more in depth explanation of factor analysis.
The goal in factor analysis is to have each factor describe the 
variation shared in common by the subset of variables highly related to 
it and not describing the variation in the other variables. This is 
accomplished when there are high factor loadings on the highly related 
variables and very low factor loadings on the remaining variables. In 
this study, factor analysis is utilized to help quantify the meaningful 
factors which describe the independent variables. These are the same 
variables that were going to be the regressors in the regression 
analysis.
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Stastical Methodology
In completing this factor analysis, the methodological steps as 
outlined in Kleinbaum and Kupper [1976] are followed. The first step 
consists of setting up the data for input. This involves imputing 
various combinations of communalities and, after completing steps two 
and three, finding the combination which produces the best results. 
Three different combinations of communalities are tried. They are: 1)
use the communalities which are derived from the initial factor 
analysis. These are reinserted into the diagonal of the data matrix and 
the analysis is run again. This is repeated until the sets of 
communality values converge. 2) Use the largest (in absolute value)
correlation coefficient associated with each variable. 3) use the 
original 1's which are associated with the major diagonal of the 
correlation matrix.
The second step involves determining ther factors. There are many 
extraction techniques which can be used. The extraction methods called 
principal components and principal axis factoring are used in this 
study.
The final step involves the rotation of initial factors. This 
helps in the interpretation of the factors. There are two main methods 
of rotation. They are referred to as orthogonal and oblique rotation. 
There are several different techniques of rotation which fall under each 
of these main methods. For this analysis, varimax and quartimax were 
used, along with obliminin. The first two techniques fall under the
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heading of orthogonal rotation while the latter belongs to the oblique 
method of rotation.
Results
After running factor analysis through the 18 possible combinations, 
the best results are derived using the extraction method of principal 
components, the quartimax method of matrix rotation, and having 1's on 
the diagonal correlation matrix. The results are in table 4-5. These 
numbers are from the rotated matrix.
In analyzing these results remember that an objective of factor 
analysis is to have each factor uniquely define a group of correlated 
variables. This is accomplished except for the variables Y and 
PREFENCE. In these two cases, a significant proportion of their 
variation is accounted for in more than one factor.
Factor one explains 24 percent of the total variation in the data. 
To do this, it takes on the characteristics that the variables WATER, 
UTILITYS, Y, and RESIDENC have in common. A measure of wealth is an 
attribute that all of these variables have in common. As a result, 
factor one may be interpreted as a proxy measure of wealth.
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Table 4-5: Results From Factor Analysis
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Water .7555
Utilitys .7070
Y .5809 .4601
Residenc .5304
Years -.7456
Prefrnce .6569 -.4171
Future .7354
Rattleh2 .6519
Eigen Value 1.919 1.326 1.268
% of Variation 24 16.6 15.9
Factor two explains 16.6 percent of the total variation in the 
data. It subsumes the common characteristics of the variables YEARS and 
PREFRNCE. Note that there is a negative relationship between YEARS and 
factor two. Factor two reflects the attributes of feelings toward 
consuming Rattlesnake Creek water. Because of these attitudes, factor 
two is referred to as tastes. It was noted during the questionnaire 
process the reluctance of elderly people to pay more for any type of 
water. The major reason for this is budgetary constraints. Fixed 
incomes are prevalent among this age group. The existence of the 
variable Y in this factor further supports the hypothesis that factor 
two represents a viewpoint concerning the consumption of Rattlesnake 
Creek drinking water.
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Factor three represents the combined effects that are unique to the
variables' FUTURE and RATTLEH2, and to some degree PREFRNCE. This
factor explains 15.9 percent of the variation within the data. A common 
embodiment between these variables is the expression of preference. 
Factor three is referred to as preconceived preferences. This is 
because the variables FUTURE and RATTLEH2 measure preconceived value 
judgements.
Several observations may be drawn from this analysis. Since 56.4 
percent of the total variation in the data is explained by the three 
factors, there is a large amount of information which is unique to the 
individual variables. This implies that they all contribute some 
information to the study. A converse viewpoint may also be taken. If 
the three factors are able to explain only 56 percent of the variation, 
new variables should be added to the questionnaire. Hopefully, this 
would include more attributes which would be correlated with existing 
variables. This would result in a more complete explanation of the
variation within the data. This analysis has shown the importance the
three factors wealth, taste, and preconceived preference play in 
determining consumer's surplus values. If the goal of a study is to 
develop an explanatory equation of consumer's surplus, these three 
variables should be included.
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CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
The three objectives of this paper as put forth in the preceding 
chapter are analyzed in the following sections. The dollar estimates 
for Rattlesnake Creek water are discussed in section 5.2. The problem 
of framing bias is analyzed in section 5-3- Section 5.4 contains the 
analysis pertaining to decision weights. Section 5.5 summarizes the 
results of this paper. It analyzes the effect that prospect theory has 
on the disparity between the two measures of value. The recommendations 
for areas of analysis which would be worthy of further study are also 
included.
5.2 Empirical Estimates for Rattlesnake Water
Discrepancies Between Compensating and Equivalent Variation
This section is concerned with the type of relationship that was 
found to exist between compensating and equivalent variation. It also 
calculates the consumers' surplus for Rattlesnake Creek water. The 
problems associated with this calculation are also explored.
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The two measures of consumer's surplus, compensating and equivalent 
variation, have been shown to be' significantly different from zero and 
significantly different from each other. In the Rattlesnake Creek 
study, the equivalent variation value is $6.40 and the compensation 
variation value is $2.80. This is a difference of $3*60, or equivalent 
variation is approximately 2.3 times larger than compensating variation. 
This difference is incompatible with present day economic theory. 
However, it does fall well within the range of size differentials of 
many other empirical analyses which have attempted to measure these 
values.
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 of this chapter will provide insight into why 
the difference between the measures of value exists. Before proceeding 
to these sections, an example is presented which illustrates the problem 
that occurs in an empirical study when compensating and equivalent 
variation differ.
Consumers' surplus for Rattlesnake Creek Water
To measure the excess value of Rattlesnake Creek water above its 
market price is to measure the consumer's surplus for Rattlesnake Creek 
water. To obtain the consumers' surplus figure, the total number of 
residential consumers of water is multiplied by either equivalent or 
compensating variation. In conversations with Mountain Water Company it 
was found that at any given time the number of water consumers is 16,000 
with an approximate error margin of 200 consumers in either direction. 
This number includes flat rate and meter customers. The 16,000 figure
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will be used for computational ease. The problem is choosing which 
measure of consumers' surplus should be used. If the compensating 
variation figure of 2.80 is chosen, the consumers' surplus associated 
with drinking Rattlesnake Creek water is $44,800. But, using the 
equivalent variation value of $6.40, the measure of consumers' surplus 
is increased to $102,400. It should be noted that these measures of 
consumers' surplus are very basic. For example, option value was not 
considered.
The implications for policy decisions are readily evident. The 
$50,000 annuity per year for the cost of a new water treatment plant is 
a good example. If the compensating variation value is used as the 
basis of consumers' surplus, the project is not feasible. However, the 
project becomes feasible when the equivalent variation calculation is 
used. This is assuming that either compensating or equivalent variation 
are the sole benefits of the project.
The question remains; which is the correct value to use? It has 
been suggested in the literature that the proper recourse depends upon 
the placement of property rights. According to Krutilla and Fisher 
[1975], if the individual owns the commodity in question, the proper 
measure is equivalent variation. If the individual does not own the 
commodity in question, then compensating variation is the proper 
measure.
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There appears to be no concrete path to follow. Haramack and Brown 
[1974] used compensating variation In their study. This was because 
their analysis involved the study and preservation of waterfowl wetlands 
and the large majority of breeding sites that are threatened lie on 
private farmland. Thus, they used the criteria of property rights. 
However, Schulze et.al. [1981] state that the disparity between the two 
measures of value is of little importance. They used both values.
Another technique which has been subscribed to in similar studies 
and the one which this paper will adhere to, is to use the two measures 
of value as boundaries. This is a conservative approach. It involves 
calculating the compensating value and using it as the lowest measure of
consumer's surplus possible. The equivalent variation value is used as
an upper boundary on consumer's surplus. Using this criteria, it is 
correct to state that the minimum aggregate consumers' surplus for 
Rattlesnake Creek water is $44,800. A positive aspect of using this 
approach is its conservatism. The low dollar value is hard to dispute.
5.3 The Question of Framing Bias
The purpose of this and the following section is to evaluate the 
empirical analysis to see if we may discern why compensating and
equivalent variation differ. The hypothesis that framing bias has an
impact upon the difference between compensating and equivalent variation 
is analyzed in this section.
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Comparison of Questions and Values
In chapter four, it was established that the framing bias question 
elicited a mean bid of $M.09 which is statistically significant from 
zero. The next steps are to ascertain if there is any framing bias, and 
if so, its implications.
It is important to understand how the three questions concerning 
WTP, FRAME, and WTS were designed or framed. The WTP question asks the 
consumer to pay. In return, the individual gains the use of Rattlesnake 
drinking water. The FRAME question also asks the consumer to pay, but, 
the individual is asked to pay to avoid the loss of Rattlesnake drinking 
water. The WTS question is framed so that the individual receives 
payment which compensates him for the loss of drinking water. In 
summary, the questions concerning WTP and FRAME are similar in that the 
individuals are asked to make payments, and the questions involving 
FRAME and WTS are concerned with a potential loss to the individual.
In all of the following analysis, no outliers are excluded. It is 
felt that the outliers are not of a large enough distance from the mean 
values to warrant discarding them. The hypothesis that there is no 
difference between the mean bids of WTP and FRAME has been rejected at a 
high confidence level. This is interpreted to mean that framing bias is 
present in this study. Both WTP and FRAME measure a compensating 
variation value. The only difference is that the former is framed as a 
gain while the latter is framed as a loss. Thus, it was expected that 
there would be no difference between the two bids.
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The presence of framing bias makes the hypothesis of invariance 
suspect. It appears that values can be manipulated by merely framing a 
question in a different perspective. This suggests that the problem of 
measurement concerning compensating and equivalent variation lies not in 
economic theory but rather in decision theory.
To further study the roles that perceived gains and losses play in 
decision theory let us turn the analysis toward the relationship between 
the questions concerned with WTS and FRAME. Both of these questions are 
framed so that the individual is confronted with a potential loss of a 
commodity. The null hypothesis of no difference between the means is 
accepted at the 88 percent confidence level. At this confidence level 
no conclusions can be made with certainty. It does suggest that there 
is a strong possibility that the means are related to one another in 
some manner. It can be stated that these two questions have a stronger 
relationship between each other than do the questions WTP and FRAME.
Conclusions
The following are the important observations which can be drawn 
from this section: 1) Framing bias is present and does have an impact
on the dollar values which people give in response to direct questions; 
2) The credibility of the hypothesis invariance is suspect; and 3) It 
appears that the way a question is framed has a greater impact on the 
answer than does the fact that a person makes or receives payments. 
More explicitly, making or receiving monetary payments affects the bid 
by a smaller amount than does the direction a decision is perceived to
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be i.e., a gain or a loss.
It is also observed that the two questions associated with the loss 
of Rattlesnake water have higher dollar bids. This is in agreement with 
the loss aversion principle which was mentioned in chapter three. This 
loss aversion effects individuals regardless of whether they are making 
or receiving monetary payments.
The validity of the invariance hypothesis is brought into question 
by the preceding results. This is because of the existence of framing 
bias. The validity of the invariance hypothesis will continue to be 
explored in the following section. However, instead of framing bias, 
decision weights which are associated with various levels of risk will 
be the tools used.
5.4 Decision Weights
This section is concerned with the comparison of equivalent and 
compensating variation mean bids at various risk levels. The 
implications of the nonlinear decision weight function will be included. 
The impact which risk has upon the various bids will also be discussed. 
The effect of nonlinear decision weights upon the hypothesis of 
invariance is of particular interest.
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Analysis of Values with Risk
It is shown in chapter four that at all ten risk levels, the 
hypothesis of compensating and equivalent variation values being equal 
is rejected by at least the 90 percent level. This confidence interval 
increased to the 99 percent level after the ten percent chance of 
acquifer depletion. Even though these variables differ significantly, 
they do share some similar traits.
The most interesting similar trait is the way the two values 
maintain their pattern of disparity throughout the bidding process. For 
example, the compensating mean bid for the ten percent risk of acquifer 
depletion is $3*15 and at 100 percent risk the mean bid is $19.75, a 
difference of 6.27 times. The equivalent mean bid for the ten percent 
level of risk is $4.52 and at 100 percent risk the mean bid is $28.86, a 
difference of 6.38 times.
Another example in which the two measures of value mimic each other 
may be seen in table 5-1. Notice how the increases in bids follow a 
pattern up to the 70 percent level of risk. The values alternate 
between an increase and a decrease over their previous bid values.
I feel that there are three possible explanations for the way the 
compensating and equivalent variation values react in similar patterns, 
even though their respective bid values do differ significantly from one 
another. The first reason is the small size of the sample. The answers 
which were elicited for the RWTS question were calculated using 29 
observations. The second reason can be attributed to bidding bias. The
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respondents in this survey may have placed a bid on one value based upon 
their bid on the other measure of value. For example: the respondents
compensating variation value may be based upon their bid on the 
equivalent variation value. The compensating variation value may be a 
function of the equivalent variation.
The third explanation involves the assumption that the respondents 
reacted in a prescribed decision making process, perhaps in accordance 
with prospect theory. The data supports the hypothesis of loss 
aversion. At the ten percent level of risk, the equivalent variation 
value is 1.46 times greater than the compensating variation value. At 
the 100 percent level, the equivalent variation value is 1.43 times 
greater than the compensating value. This implies that when the 
individuals were confronted with the two value questions, there was a 
'constant' factor which differentiated them. It is possible that this 
'constant' factor is merely the measure for loss aversion or the 
compensation which is used to equilibrate a potential loss and gain 
situation.
Any one of these proposed solutions may be correct, or an entirely 
different hypothesis may provide the correct answer to this problem. 
This area may be worthwhile to explore in further study. A more complex 
questionnaire is needed in order to check for bidding bias or the 
possibility of a loss aversion factor.
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Table 5-1: Increases In Bids With Various Risk Levels
Level of Compensating Increases Equivalent Increases
Risk Bids ($) in Bids ($) Bids ($) in Bids
10 3.15
0.82
4.52
1.88
20 3.97
1.42
6.40
2.56
30 5.39
1.03
8.96
1.75
40 6.42
1.77
10.71
2.83
50 8.19
1.26
13.54
1.56
60 9.45
0.82
15.10
1.83
70 10.27
1.67
16.93
2.02
80 11.94
2.74
18.95
2.83
90 14.68
5.07
21.88
6.98
100 19.75 28.86
Analysis of Decision Weights
The idea behind building a decision weight function is to determine 
if there is any merit in the hypothesis that risk plays a role in the 
disparity between compensating and equivalent variation. The theory of 
expected utility stipulates that the value of an outcome is a linear 
function of the probability of it occurring. Kahneman and Tversky put 
forth the hypothesis that the value of an outcome is not a linear 
function. They derived a weighting function which is dependent upon 
probability but not in a linear fashion. In accordance with Kahneman 
and Tversky's thesis, the decision weight function derived in chapter 
five is nonlinear.
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The nonlinear shapes of the decision weight functions are very
similar to the hypothetical weighting function which was derived by
Kahneman and Tversky [1984]. Their hypothetical curve has the following 
similar characteristics: 1) Moderate and high probabilities are
underweighted relative to sure outcomes; and 2) Low probabilities are 
overweighted and very low probabilities are usually overweighted quite 
highly.
Underweighting of medium to high probabilities contributes to risk 
aversion in gains by reducing the attractiveness of positive gambles.
It also contributes to risk seeking in losses by lessening the
aversiveness of negative gambles. The opposite effects are true in
regard to the overweighting of low probabilities. People are risk
seeking in events that are characterized by improbable gains and risk 
averse in situations which involve unlikely losses [Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984].
Given these assumptions, what are the effects on the values of
Rattlesnake water? In regard to the equivalent variation question, 
respondents reacted in a risk averse manner for the 10 and 20 percent 
probabilities and in a risk seeking manner for probabilities greater 
than 40 percent. Respondents reacted in the opposite manner when 
confronted with the question concerning compensating variation values. 
At the 10 percent level of risk, individuals gave a risk seeking 
response; for probabilities greater than 30 percent respondents gave a 
risk averse response.
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There is one other matter to consider concerning decision weights; 
the effect of nonlinear decision weights upon the hypothesis of
invariance. If a person reacts in a different manner to the same type
of question, then the hypothesis of invariance is invalidated. This 
occurs when decision weights are nonlinear. For example, individuals 
responded in a risk averse manner when faced with moderate to high 
probabilities of success and in a risk seeking manner when faced with 
low probabilities of success (in the case of compensating variation). 
People reacted in different ways to the same question. This shows that 
the hypothesis of invariance is not valid due to the nonlinearity of 
decision weights. Kahneman and Tversky state that the invalidation of 
the hypothesis of invariance due to nonlinear decision weights..., "has
been confirmed with both real and hypothetical monetary pay offs, with
human lives as outcomes, and with a nonsequential representation of the 
chance process” [Kahneman and Tversky 1984 p.3451.
5.5 Conclusions of Study
The Invariance Hypothesis
This paper was undertaken in an attempt to solve the question of 
why compensating variation and equivalent variation differ when 
empirically measured. It was proposed that a hypothesis within decision 
theory - invariance - does not accurately reflect the way individuals 
make decisions. Prospect theory was presented as an alternative method 
of describing the way in which individuals make decisions.
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This study has provided a specific case where people do not react 
in a manner consistent with current economic theory. For example, the 
switching of decisions from being risk averse to risk seeking just by 
changing the level of risk is not consistent with economic theory. A 
new theory to explain decision making among economic agents may be 
necessary.
An empirical analysis involving Rattlesnake Creek water was 
designed. This analysis is similar to other studies that have been 
completed and which involve the measurement of compensating and 
equivalent variation. One difference between this and the other studies 
is the specific testing of the validity of the invariance hypothesis. 
Through the existence of framing bias and nonlinear decision weights, 
this study has shown that the invariance hypothesis is invalid. It is 
the author's hypothesis that this failure of invariance leads to the 
discrepancy between the two measures of consumer's surplus.
The hypothesis of invariance has been shown to be incorrect. 
People seem to react differently (in terms of higher or lower bids) 
depending on whether the decision they are confronted with is perceived 
as a loss or as a gain. Prospect theory differentiates between risky 
decisions which involve gains and risky decisions which involve losses. 
A hypothesis of prospect theory, the endowment effect, stipulates that a 
risky opportunity involving a perceived potential loss is valued more 
highly than is an equivalent opportunity involving a perceived potential 
gain. One of the objectives of this paper was to apply the hypothesis 
of endowment effects to the disparity problem between the two measures
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of value. It is assumed that asking an individual to forego the use of 
a commodity in lieu of a payment is viewed as a loss of the good. 
Conversely, asking an individual to pay to obtain the use of a commodity 
is viewed as a gain to the consumer. This is because the individual has 
gained access to the good. Given the above assumptions; prospect 
theory provides a good explanation as to why the two measures, 
compensating and equivalent variation, differ. In this study, 
equivalent variation is associated with the gain of a good and 
compensating variation is associated with the loss of a good.
It is my hypothesis that the failure of invariance leads to the 
discrepancy between the two measures of consumer's surplus. The failure 
of the invariance hypothesis implies that individuals make decisions 
based on the way the problem is framed. Using the assumption that 
individuals differentiate between a decision which involves a gain and 
one that involves a loss, the disparity in measurements between 
compensating and equivalent variation may be explained. This disparity 
is based upon the loss aversion effect. People demand a larger payment 
when they feel that they are confronted with a loss.
This study indicates the disparity between compensating and 
equivalent variation is inevitable so long as decisions are based upon 
the loss aversion principle and the hypothesis of invariance is not 
followed. The conclusions stated above indicate that the decision 
theory which is currently the state of the art be evaluated and altered 
so that it can accommodate the preferences and attitudes which this 
study has shown individuals to have.
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Prospect Theory and its Potential
It has been shown that prospect theory deviates from the decision 
theory which is currently employed in economic theory. It is beyond the 
resources of this study to test the validity of prospect theory. 
However, at the level which this paper has been able to explore prospect 
theory, the results appear to explain some of the discrepancies which 
are associated with the measurement of compensating and equivalent 
variation. Similar to the examples which were given in chapter two, the 
major concepts will be illustrated. However, in these examples the 
empirical study will be the reference point.
It has been shown that the hypothesis of decision weights is 
viable. However, this study was not designed to test the impact that 
decision weights have on the outcomes which were derived. The only 
conclusions that can be drawn about decision weights from this study is 
that, depending upon the probability of an event occurring, they result 
in underweighting and overweighting of outcomes.
The concepts associated with the value curve, framing bias, and 
consumer's surplus were tested in this paper. The question eliciting 
the compensating variation value was framed as a potential gain of 
Rattlesnake Creek water and the question eliciting the equivalent 
variation value was framed as a potential loss of Rattlesnake Creek 
water. According to the hypotheses which underly the value curve and in 
particular the loss aversion hypothesis, the question which is concerned 
with the loss should result in a higher value. The equivalent variation
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measure was greater. The testing of framing bias also resulted in 
accord with decision theory. It was found that objectively equivalent 
questions derived different results. Both questions required the 
respondents to pay a sum of money. The only difference was that in the 
WTP question the individual would be acquiring Rattlesnake Creek water 
and in the FRAME question the individual would be avoiding the loss of 
Rattlesnake water. In accord with the loss aversion effect, the 
question associated with the potential loss - FRAME - elicited the 
higher value. Thus, the major concepts of decision theory all predicted 
correctly in this empirical study.
Impact of This Study
This study has proven that people do not react in a manner which is 
recognized by current economic theory. For example, the switching of 
decisions from being risk averse to risk seeking just by changing the 
level of risk is not consistent with economic theory. A new theory to 
explain decision making among economic agents may be necessary. 
Prospect theory has been presented, not necessarily as an alternative 
theory but rather as one which incorporates actual attributes of 
decision makers.
Although there are problems found within the decision theory which 
is incorporated in microeconomics, the conclusions of this paper do not 
dictate the revamping of microeconomic theory. However, this study does 
point out that there is a need to reconcile reality i.e., individuals 
making actual market decisions and microeconomic theory. The author
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suggests that this reconciliation be brought about by alleviating the 
deficiency which has been shown in decision theory. Primarily, this 
study has proven that the concepts of decision weights, framing bias,
and loss aversion should be included in a revamped decision theory.
Areas of Further Study
There are four areas of research which I believe would be
beneficial to pursue. All of these will help rectify the disparity
between compensating and equivalent variation.
One area of study involves the realm of psychology. This analysis 
would determine how individuals make decisions under risk. It would be 
of significance to find out if decisions are based upon a cognitive 
decision making process, a spur of the moment decision, or something 
entirely unrelated.
One of the major problems associated with the empirical study
presented in this paper is the small sample size. To validate the 
results which are presented in this paper, many additional studies are 
needed. In particular, these studies should concentrate their 
objectives on determining if the relationship holds between gains versus 
losses, and payments made versus payments received. The idea that a 
perceived loss is weighted more heavily in an individual's decision 
making than an equivalent cash outlay is a new concept which requires 
more proof.
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Another interesting area for further research lies in the direction 
of decision weights. It would be of interest to find out what causes 
the weighting function to be weighted differently at various levels of 
risk. In this study, decision weights alternated between high and low 
values for most of the function. Finding out if this is a consistent 
pattern of behavior, and if so, why, would be valuable information.
A fourth area of research would be the derivation of individual 
utility functions. The utility functions would be derived for two 
reasons. The first reason would be to determine if individuals behave 
in both a risk seeking and a risk averse manner. If this proves to be 
correct, the next step would be to analyze the respective slopes of the 
utility function. It would be interesting to see if a relationship 
could be found between the risk averse and risk seeking portions of the 
functions and the disparity between the compensating and equivalent 
variation values.
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APPENDIX A
Questionnaire Used For Data Collection
This appendix contains the questionnaire which was derived to
elicit responses concerning Rattlesnake Creek drinking water. 
Respondents were read the background information and the questions. No 
additional information was given until after the interview. It is
assumed that this minimizes information bias. Also listed in this
appendix are tables which contain the data that was used in the
statistical analysis.
Questionnaire:
Type of residence: Apt. 1 room__ , 2 or greater___. House, less than 5
rooms , 5 or greater _.
INTRODUCTION
Until 1983* a large portion of Missoula consumed Rattlesnake water 
for approximately nine months out of every year. Since the problem of 
Giardia developed in the summer of 1983, Missoula water consumers have 
relied completely on well water.
Some problems have been noticed by consumer's since they have 
started using well water on a full time basis. One of the problems is 
that Missoula's well water is seven times as hard as Rattlesnake water. 
Hardness refers to the amount of mineral content in the water. The 
harder water results in deposits building up in appliances such as dish 
washers. Restaurants complain about the difficulty of having their 
dishes look clean. For home owners this problem often necessitates the 
installation of a water softener.
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„ There is a positive health effect which is attributed to harder 
water. Medical evidence shows that there is improvement within the 
cardio vascular system when hard water is consumed.
At present there are studies underway which are analyzing the 
feasibility of installing a water treatment plant on the Rattlesnake. 
If a treatment plant was installed it would make Rattlesnake water 
available for personal consumption once again. I would like to 
emphasize that this study is in no way concerned with the current 
problem involving ownership of the water company.
1) How many years have you lived in Missoula? ____ .
2) Have you previously consumed Rattlesnake water? 0=No ___ , 1=Yes
3) What is your average water bill per month? $________ .
4) Assume that it would be possible to consume Rattlesnake water if a 
water treatment plant is built. What is the maximum amount which you 
would be willing to have added on to to have added on to your existing 
monthly water bill to give you the opportunity to be able to consume 
Rattlesnake rather than well water? ________ .
NOTE: IF ALL UTILITIES ARE SUBSUMED UNDER RENTAL AGREEMENT ASK:
what is the maximum amount you would be willing to have added on to your 
monthly rental agreement?
5) Do you believe that it will be possible for you to be able to consume 
Rattlesnake water in the foreseeable future? 0=N0 _____ , 1=YES .
6) Imagine that you are currently consuming Rattlesnake water and the 
water company issues a report which states that they will be forced to
shut off Rattlesnake water next month due to high costs unless consumers
would be willing to pay higher water bills. What is the maximum 
increase in your monthly water bill that you would allow in order that 
you continue the Rattlesnake water service? _______________.
7) Excluding the cost of your water bill, what would your total utility 
bill be per month on the average? $_________.
8) Assume that a law is passed which outlaws the building of a water
treatment plant on the Rattlesnake. This means that the Rattlesnake 
source would be unavailable for usage for the foreseeable future. What 
is the minimum amount which could be deducted from your monthly water 
bill that would just compensate you for not being able to use 
Rattlesnake water? $_______ .
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In the following set of questions I am going to test to see how
your monetary valuations change as I vary the probabilities of an event
occurring. I am going to present to you different decisions which 
involve various levels of risk or probability. These decisions are 
concerned with acquifer depletion. Many people believe that this
problem exists today. An acquifer can be thought of as an underground 
lake which is fed by very slow moving underground streams. Our wel
systems withdraw water from these lakes. Acquifer depletion occurs when 
the wells are withdrawing more water from the lake than can be 
replenished by the feeder streams.
Note: Ask the respondent each percentage.
9) Assume that you know the chance of Missoula’s underground lakes being 
completely depleted within the next five years is:
10%  , 20$  ,
30$
50%
70%
90%
40%
60%
80%
100%
but, by consuming Rattlesnake water this problem would be partially if 
not fully alleviated. If using well water creates some negative 
feelings for you, how much would have to be paid through lower bills to 
continue to use only well water.
10) If you knew that by continuing to consume only well water the risk 
of depleting Missoula's acquifer was;
20%  ,10$
30$
50$
70$
90$
40$
60$
80$
100$
what is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay through increases 
in your monthly water bills to be able to consume Rattlesnake water?
11) Which one of the following categories would the income level of this 
household belong to:
Category 1: 
Category 2:
$0 - 8,000.
$8,000 - 16,000.
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Category 3: $16,000 - 24,000.
Category 4: $24,000 - 32,000.
Category 5: $32,000 - 40,000.
Category 6: $40,000 - 50,000.
Category 7: Greater than $50,000
12) Which type of water would you prefer, Rattlesnake or well water,
given that both cost the same and were equally safe? 0=Well ___,
1=Rattle
The variable names are listed below, along with the appropriate 
questions which pertain to them. The variable RESIDENC is not 
associated with any question. It was noted by the individual giving the 
survey.
Question 1 = YEARS
Question 2 = RATTLEH2
Question 3 = WATER
Question 4 = WTP
Question 5 = FUTURE
Question 6 = FRAME
Question 7 = UTILITYS
Question 8 = WTS
Question 9 = RWTS
Question 10 = RWTP
Question 11 = Y
Question 12 = PREFRNCE
110
Data Elicited From Survey
Area of Well Usage
Res yr rat wat wtp fut fra util wts Y Pi
1
2 3 18 1 14.0 0.0 0 0.0 50.0 0.0 1 2
3 3 33 1 10.98 0.0 1 0.0 45.0 0.0 2 0
4
5 4 26 1 14.7 0.0 1 14.0 70.0 20.0 7 2
6 4 15 1 15.0 3.75 0 5.25 85.00 10.0 6 2
7 4 7 1 -7 0.0 1 0 50.00 5.00 4 0
8
9 3 7 0 10.98 0.0 1 0.0 30.0 0.0 1 2
10 3 20 1 17.0 0.0 1 0.0 60.0 0.0 3 0
11 4 49 1 13.6 0.0 0 0.0 70.0 0 -1 0
12 4 62 1 12.29 2.0 1 2.0 50.0 2 2 2
13 3 16 1 8.0 0.0 1 0 80.0 0 -1 0
14 2 27 1 -8 5.0 1 5.0 40.0 5.0 3 0
15 2 29 1 11.0 2.0 1 0.0 70.0 2.0 1 0
16 2 4 1 10.98 2.0 0 2.0 25.0 4.0 1 2
Area of Rattlesnake Water Usage 
res yr rat wat wtp fut fra util wts Y pre
1 4 12 1 13.6 1.0 1 1.5 120.0 1.0 2 2
2 ft#***
3
4 4 28 1 12.29 0.0 1 5.0 40.0 6.0 4 2
5 3 10 1 -8 4.00 1 8.0 40.00 5.50 3 2
6
7 2 7 1 -8 5.00 1 10.0 -8 10.0 1 2
8 2 40 1 14.9 0.0 0 0.0 80.0 0.0 3 1
9 2 4 1 10.98 1.0 0 0.0 65.0 0 5 2
10 3 1 1 10.98 0.0 0 1.1 30.0 0 1 2
11 2 50 0 10.98 0.0 0 0.0 70.0 0 2 2
12 3 54 1 11.0 1.1 1 1.1 35.0 1.1 2 2
13 2 7 1 15.84 7.9 1 7.9 80.0 15.84 4 2
14 3 10 1 12.0 5.00 1 5.0 75.0 7.50 3 2
15 3 43 1 12.3 3.0 1 3.0 60.0 5.0 2 2
16 3 28 1 12.0 0.0 1 0.0 100.0 0.0 3 1
17 2 5 1 -8 10.0 1 15.0 35.0 10.0 3 2
18 2 26 1 11.0 9.00 1 10.0 65.0 15.0 3 2
19 2 13 1 8.00 5.00 1 4.00 30.0 50.0 4 2
20 3 29 1 12.3 2.00 0 5.00 110.0 7.00 4 2
21 3 4 1 10.98 10.98 1 10.98 25 10.98 4 2
22 2 19 1 11.9 10.0 1 15.0 75.0 11.9 7 2
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Area of Well Usage measuring RWTS
% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
3 0 3.3 4.4 5.5 6.6 11 12.1 13-3 14.4 15.5
4 ««««
5 2.8 5.6 8.4 11.2 14.0 16.8 19.6 22.4 25.2 28
6 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33
7 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
8 %«««
9 4 5 6 6 7 10 10 10 10 10
10 1.7 4.25 5.1 6.8 8.5 10.2 11.9 13.6 15.3 17
11 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
12 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 30 40 60 70 100 100 100 100 100 150
15 0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
16 5 5 5 6 6 8 9 9 10 18
Area of Rattlesnake Water Usage measuring RWTS
% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1
2
25 25 25 27 32 37 42 49 55 70
3
4 1.2 2.4 3-6 4.8 6 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12
5C 0 2.5 5 7.5 7.5 9 10.5 13 14 150
7 2 2 3 3 4 5 8 9 10 15
8Q 0 1 4.5 6 7 9 10.5 12 13.5 15y
10 0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 0 2 2.5 3 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 4
12 1.1 1.65 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.75 3.3 3.85 4.4 5.5
13 7.9 7.9 8.69 9.48 11.10 11.85 12.64\ 14.22 15.01 31-6
14 3 3 4 4 6 8 8 8 8 8
15 1.2 2.4 3.6 4.8 5 6.2 7.4 8.6 9.8 10
16 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
17 5 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 25 30
18 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10.98
19 5 7 7.4 8.2 9 9.8 10.6> 11.4 12.2 13
20 4 6 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 13
21 10.9 10.9 10.9 15.9 15.'9 10.9 20. SI 20.9 20.9 30.9
22 15 25 50 60 80 90 100 125 175 250
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Area of Well Usage measuring RWTP
% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 ####
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 #*«#
9 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 10 20
10 1.7 4.25 5.1 6.8 8.5 10.2 11.9 13-6 15.3 17
11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 .4 .8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4
13 0 0 0 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
14 25 25 25 35 50 60 60 70 75 100
15 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
16 2 2 3 3 5 5 6 7 8 10
Area of Rattlesnake Usage measuring RWTP 
% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
2
3
4 1.2 2.4 3.6 4.8 6 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12
5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
6
7
m «
2 2 5 5 7 10 12 12 15 20
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9
10
m m
1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
11 0 .5 1 1 1.5 1.5 2 2 3 15
12 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 2 2 2.5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5
15 0 4 5 5.5 5.8 6 7 8 9 10
16 .6 1.2 1.8 2.4 3 3.6 4.2 4.8 5.6 6.2
17 5 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 25 30
18 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
19 3 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.7 6
20 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
21 11 11 11 11 11 16 16 19 21 31
22 15 25 50 60 80 90 100 125 175 250
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Comments Pertaining To the Data
The negative numbers in the data set indicate missing values. A 
(-1) means that the respondent refused to answer the question. A (-7) 
indicates that the respondent draws water from a private well. A (-8) 
indicates that the respondent had either their utility and/or their 
water bill included within their rent payments. The values (####) 
indicate that the respondent refused to answer the question. There are 
more non - responses associated with questions nine and ten than any 
other questions. This is because of the high degree of complexity 
associated with them. In particular, it was hard for individuals to 
respond to the hypothetical scenario that was presented to them.
In looking at the data one observes several numbers that appear 
with a high frequency. For example the number 10.98. This number is a 
common dollar figure for a water bill. Respondents apparently used this 
figure as a reference point for answering some of the other questions.
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APPENDIX B
Factor Analysis
To fully explain the concept and the working mechanics of factor 
analysis would require a paper devoted entirely to this subject. This 
appendix is an overview of the concept of factor analysis plus a 
glossary of the terms which were mentioned in the central body of the 
paper. In addition to the glossary, the implications of the terms, 
(when appropriate), are given.
The objective in factor analysis is to create new variables which 
uniquely define two or more intercorrelated variables. This enhances 
data interpretation and alleviates multicollinearity problems in 
regression analysis by using the newly created variables. In factor 
analysis: "each variable may be regarded as a dependent variable that
is regressed on a set of independent 'unobserved' factors, each of which 
in turn is a function of all original variables" [Cooper 1983 p.145].
Communal!ties: This term refers to diagonal elements on the
correlation matrix. Obviously, these numbers are equal to 1 on an 
untouched correlation matrix. However, some researchers believe that it 
is correct to replace these superfluous 1's with some other numbers 
(called communalities) and then subject this revamped correlation matrix 
to factor analysis [Kleinbaum and Kupper 1976]. This study used the 
extraction method called principal axis and replaced the diagonals with
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communalities for one analysis. These communalities consisted of the 
largest (in absolute value) correlation for each value [Kleinbaum and
Kupper 1976 p.3S6]. This did not prove to be productive.
Eigen Value: This is the total amount of variance for all of the
variables which is accounted by each factor. It is calculated by
squaring and them summing all of the factor loadings for each factor. 
With the eigen value it is easy to calculate the percentage of total 
variation explained by each factor. In factor analysis the variables 
are standardized. Thus, the percentage of explained total variation is 
calculated by dividing the eigen value by the total number of variables 
used in the analysis.
Extraction method: Refers to the technique which is used to
generate the factors. Principal components analysis and principal axis
factoring are the two extraction methods used in this study.
Factor: This term refers to the hypothetical variables created
using factor analysis. A factor can be defined as a weighted linear 
combination of the original variables where the weights are estimated 
from the data. [Kleinbaum and Kupper. 1976 p.381] Positive attributes 
of factors consist of interdependence among factors and either very high 
or very low factor loadings among individual factors. In this study 
there are three factors that are derived. They are referred to as
wealth, tastes, and preconceived preferences. These names apply to
factor one, factor two, and factor three, respectively. The factors are 
referred to in this manner because they reflect these values.
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Factor loadings: These are coefficients which describe the
correlation between a derived factor and an original variable. These 
coefficients point out how each variable is correlated to each factor 
under optimum conditions. It is preferred that each variable has a high
factor loading associated with only one factor, with the rest of the
loadings being very small.
Principal components: This is a technique used to derive factors.
With this method, no assumptions about the underlying structure of the 
variables i.e., collinearity, are made. This technique seeks: "that
set of linear combinations of the original variables that absorb and 
account for the maximum possible proportion of total variation in those 
variables" [Cooper 1983 p.144]. This technique: Determines factors in
such a way so as to explain as much of the total variation in the data 
as possible with as few of these factors as possible" [Kleinbaum and 
Kupper 1976 p.389]. The principal components method of extraction is 
the method used which derives the most satisfactory results.
Principal axis factoring: This extraction technique is equivalent
to principal components as far as under lying assumptions and intent of 
analysis. The only difference lies in its computational ability. It
allows for the use of communalities within the analysis.
Rotation: The initial matrix resulting from factor analysis
consists of the original variables and the new factors. Quite often 
these initial results are difficult to interpret. Rotation is a term 
which describes a manipulation of the factor matrix which enables the
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results to be perceived more clearly. Rotation is used, "if it is 
desired to find meaningful underlying factors that describe the 
variation in a set of variables" [Kleinbaum and Kupper 1976 p.3913-
There are two types of rotation methods: orthogonal and oblique. In
orthogonal rotation the axis of the factors are rotated at 90 degree 
angles from each other. These axes are rotated until the factors have 
the highest and/or lowest factor loadings attainable. The oblique 
method of rotation is very similar to the orthogonal method. The main 
difference lies in the way the axes are rotated. There is no precise 
relationship held between the axes. They rotate to whatever pattern 
gives the best results. Varimax and quartimax are deviations from one 
another and belong under the heading of the orthogonal method while 
obliminin is a type of oblique method.
Unlike its counterpart oblique rotation, factors which are derived 
using the orthogonal method are statistically uncorrelated. However, 
the oblique method often results in a more clear relationship between 
the original variables and the factors. This frequently results in a 
tradeoff in choosing between independence or clarity. Fortunately, in 
this study quartimax rotation has the best clarity or structure as well 
as being independent among the factors.
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APPENDIX C
Historical Development of Consumer's Surplus
Jules Dupuit was the first person to work with the concept of 
consumer's surplus. Dupuit was interested in how to measure public 
utility. He stated that the price which society pays for a public good 
is a minimum measure of the utility that society derives from the 
project [Dupuit 1844 p.256]. Dupuit felt that there were many examples 
of when the value of a public good (to the public) was substantially 
greater than the price which was paid to acquire the good. From this 
idea, Dupuit brought forth the concept of consumer's surplus.
After Dupuit's work, the theory of consumer's surplus lay dormant 
for over fifty years. It was revived by Alfred Marshall in his seminal 
work Principles of Economics. Marshall defined the term consumer's 
surplus to be: "The excess of the price which he, (the consumer), would
be willing to pay rather than go without the thing, over that which he 
actually does pay" [Marshall 1922 p.1243.
As a good proxy for the measurement of consumer's surplus, Marshall 
put forth the idea of using the area under the relevant portion of the 
demand curve. This idea has passed the stringent test of time. But, 
because of the assumptions which underly his demand curve (known as the 
Marshallian demand curve), his analysis has been revamped. Before 
explaining the theoretical problems which are associated with the 
Marshallian demand curve it is helpful to describe the relationship
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between consumer's surplus and the demand curve.
The Relation Between Consumer's Surplus and a Demand Curve
Concepts that are fundamental to consumer's surplus are the demand 
curve and the law of demand. The definition of a Marshallian demand 
curve is: the various quantities per unit of time that consumer's are
willing to buy at all possible price alternatives, holding constant 
tastes and preferences, price of other goods, and nominal income. 
Assuming the marginal utility of money was constant, Marshall used the 
law of diminishing marginal utility to deduce the shape of the demand 
curve. Marshall's analysis took the following line of thought. Since 
the marginal utility of money is constant, the ratio between the 
marginal utility of a commodity and its price is a constant ratio. This 
results in the downward slope of the demand curve. For example, if the 
price of good X decreases, the marginal utility of the good must also 
decrease in order to maintain the same ratio. By the law of diminishing 
marginal utility, this is accomplished by increasing the quantity 
demanded. Therefore, Marshall's law of demand stipulates that price and 
quantity have an inverse relationship with no exceptions. More 
succinctly stated, utility is maximized when the ratios of marginal 
utilities of all commodities and income are equal to their price ratios.
Marshall assumed that the price a consumer is willing to pay for a 
good is a cardinal measure of the marginal utility or the marginal 
benefit which the consumer will realize upon the purchase of the 
commodity. If the price which is available to the consumer is greater
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than what he deems as his marginal benefit, he will not complete the 
transaction. If the price just equals the marginal benefit of the good, 
the consumer will make the transaction. In this and the former scenario 
there is no positive consumer's surplus that accrues to the buyer.
When the purchase price of a good is less than the amount that the 
consumer is willing to pay, the term consumer's surplus comes into 
context. Obviously, if the market price for an additional unit of the 
product is less than what a particular person is willing to pay, there 
is some benefit which the consumer attributes to the good above the 
value which the market has placed upon the good. This "extra'* value is 
the surplus which the person acquires from the acquisition of the 
product. Because of Marshall's universal statement concerning the law 
of demand, there will always be positive consumer's surplus so long as 
the market price is less than what the buyer is willing to pay.
There is an alternative way of thinking of the relationship between 
the market price and the price a consumer is willing to pay. Due to the 
law of diminishing marginal utility and the rational maximization 
principle, a consumer places a higher value on the first unit of a good 
(reflected in a higher paid price), than he does for the second unit. 
The same idea holds with the third, fourth, etc., units. Thus a demand 
curve is a locus of marginal valuations of different levels of output. 
So long as the price is less than the consumer's marginal valuation for 
the first unit, the consumer will attain some added value - consumer's 
surplus.
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Problems in Marshall's Analysis
Marshall's analysis has given ammunition to the detractors of 
consumer's surplus. As I have previously explained, the demand curve 
and consumer's surplus are related. Therefore, the assumptions in 
Marshall's theory which relate to the demand curve affect the validity 
and/or the accuracy of this concept. The two main problems of his 
analysis as it pertained to consumer's surplus were his failure to 
recognize income effects and his use of cardinality in utility theory. 
It should be noted that all economic theorists of the 19th century 
employed cardinal utility in their analyses.
The use of cardinality in utility theory implies that it is 
possible to impute a number which corresponds to a level of satisfaction 
which is induced by the purchase of a good. To determine the quantities 
of goods which an individual will buy at given prices, Marshall's theory 
assumes that one must know his utility surface. The utility surface 
purports to state by how much one commodity bundle is preferred or 
desired over another. Marshall believed that it was possible to derive 
numerical values from a utility surface which would give exact measures 
of utility.
Marshall's second error concerns disregarding income effects and 
their effect upon demand. Marshall was able to ignore income by making 
the assumption that the marginal utility of money was constant. As 
Marshall phrased it: "At one and the same time, a persons material
resources being unchanged, the marginal utility of money to him is a
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fixed quantity, so that the prices he is just willing to pay for the two 
commodities are to one another in the same ratio as the utility of those 
two commodities” [Marshall 1922 p.95I. This means that the effect on 
demand, because of changes in real income resulting from changing 
prices, is neglected. This implies that changes in nominal income will 
not affect the marginal rate of substitution between any good and 
income. Therefore, if the consumer's income decreases and the price of 
the good remains constant, the price will still be equal to the marginal 
rate of substitution, without any change in the amount of the good 
purchased. Thus, the consumer's demand for any commodity is independent 
of their income [Hicks 1946]. Apparently, Marshall felt that most goods 
purchased are, by themselves, a negligible percentage of total income. 
This would mean that any substitution effects which are present would 
overwhelm any income effects, making their analysis irrelevant.
These two errors on Marshall's part cast doubt upon his analysis 
involving demand curves. After Marshall, there was little substantial 
improvement in the development of consumer's surplus until Hicks. Hicks 
provided the theoretical tools which clarified the concept of consumer's 
surplus.
Hicks' Theory
Sir John R. Hicks played an eminent role in the development of 
demand theory. He used the foundation which Marshall laid, but 
differred in his treatment of demand in many areas. Two of the more 
prominent aspects which he revamped are cardinality and nominal income.
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The assumption of cardinal utility theory is very restrictive if 
not unrealistic. A much less restrictive assumption, that of ordinal or 
preference theory, was put forth by Pareto in 1909. With this
assumption, the consumer is only required to be able to rank his 
preferences for purchases. The magnitude of the rankings are
irrelevant. This concept expunged a serious pitfall in economic 
literature. Unfortunately, after putting forth the idea of ordinal 
utility, Pareto took it no farther.
In papers involving Allen and Hicks [ 193-43» Slutsky [see Allen 
1936]> and Hicks [19391, preference theory was incorporated with demand 
theory. In Hicks' Value and Capital he purged all concepts tainted with 
cardinal utility. He then proceeded to rebuild consumer's demand theory 
using scales of preferences. Instead of using the notion of 
cardinality, Hicks measured amounts of money or the amount of money
spent on the (n-1) consumption goods as a measure of welfare. This was
known as Hicks' composite commodity theorem. This theorem was an 
exposition simplification. It allowed a group of commodities to be 
analyzed as a single good, so long as their price ratios remained 
constant throughout the analysis [Hicks 1956 p.36]. This made two 
dimensional analysis possible.
Marshall's demand theory, when reinterpreted using the new 
definition of utility, had greater strength due to the less restrictive 
assumption, while keeping the theory intact. A more troublesome aspect 
of Marshall's theory as it pertains to consumer's surplus is his lack of 
treatment of income effects that are associated with a price change. In
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Marshall's Principles he deduced the downward slope of the demand curve. 
There Is an inverse relationship that must always hold between price and 
quantity demanded. He states: "The one universal rule to which the
demand curve conforms is that it is inclined negatively throughout the 
whole of its length" [Marshall 1922 p.99]. Marshall implies that the 
income effect of a price change is negligible. By making the marginal 
utility of money constant it enabled him to ignore the changes in real 
income which come about because of a price change. By keeping the 
marginal utility of money constant, a price change, which changes 
income, does not affect the consumer's demand for the good because his 
demand for any commodity is independent of income.
Income Effects
Hicks realized that income effects could have a significant effect 
upon a demand curve. It should be noted that there are other 
Interpretations of Marshall besides that of Hicks. Milton Friedman 
[1949] interpreted Marshall as assuming that nominal income remained 
constant over the entire demand curve, but, at different prices real 
income changed. However, the prevalent theory has followed Hicks'.
Using two different methods, Hicks analyzed how a price change 
affected a consumer. In Value and Capital Hicks used an indifference 
diagram to illustrate substitution and income effects. In A Revision of 
Demand Theory Hicks used a marginal valuation curve as well as an 
indifference diagram to illustrate the two effects. He came to similar 
conclusions using both techniques. His analysis using indifference
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curves will be illustrated below.
In Allen and Hicks [1934], an important concept referred to as the 
expenditure curve (since renamed the income-consumption curve) was used. 
Income changes which result from price changes and their affect upon 
quantity demanded are illustrated by the income consumption curve. It 
is derived in the following fashion.
Take an indifference mapping of two goods A and B and let the locus 
of points between F and G signify the price line or budget constraint of 
the goods (see figure A3—1) - Now, a new price line JK which is parallel 
to the old one is drawn. Since JK is parallel to FG, the relative 
prices of the two goods have not changed. What has changed is income. 
It has been raised. This results in a higher level of utility, 
illustrated by II. Now, if a line is drawn between the consumption 
points W and Z, we have an income-consumption curve. Holding their 
relative prices constant, it shows how the demand for the two goods are 
affected by changes in income [Hicks 1946].
Hicks discovered that there are income effects that are associated 
with a price change. For a price decrease: "it makes the consumer
better off, it raises his real income, and its effect along this channel 
is similar to that of an increase in income" [Hicks 1942 p.31]«
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FIGURE A3-1
Income Consumption Curve
B per unit of time
Just how much does this income effect change the Marshallian demand 
curve? The consensus in the literature is that it depends upon the 
amount of money the consumer spends on the good in relation with his 
total income. Quoting Hicks in Value and Capital: "For the extent to
which he is made better off by a fall in the price of X will depend upon 
the amount of X which he was initially buying; if that amount was large 
relatively to his income, he will be made much better off, and the 
income effect will be very important; but if the amount is small, the 
gain is small, and the income effect is likely to be swamped by the 
substitution effect” [Hicks 1942 p.32]. Marshall was apparently only 
concerned with the latter, taken to its extreme because he had the 
income elasticity of demand equal to zero.
Depending upon the income elasticity of demand for the good, the 
income effects may act in two ways. If the good is normal, the income 
effect will complement the substitution effect. It is also possible for 
the good to be inferior, meaning that the income effect counteracts to 
some degree the substitution effect. Leaving out this income effect 
could result in a poor estimate of the magnitude of consumer's surplus 
due to incorrectly shaped demand curves.
Substitution Effects
Substitution effects can be measured in a manner which is analogous 
to the technique used for the income effects (see figure A3-2). 
However, when substitution effects are being measured, income is held 
constant and the price of one commodity is changed. The original price
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line is ML. The price of B is then lowered with the subsequent price
line being MP. Because of the law of diminishing marginal rate of
substitution, a price decrease for good (B) will always result in an
increase in the quantity demanded, W to Z.
The substitution effect can be proven to behave in a certain manner 
because of the law of diminishing rate of substitution. Hicks found 
that the substitution effect is always inverse to the direction of the 
price change. This is in agreement with Marshall and has no effect upon 
the theory of demand.
The law of demand can now be seen to be a sum of two components: 
the substitution and income effects which arise from a price change. A 
fall in the price of a good raises the consumer's real income, and this 
effect upon demand is similar to that of an increase in income. A fall 
in the price also changes relative prices, resulting in the substitution 
effect. As long as the good in question is normal or the good does not 
take up a large percentage of income, the demand curve will always be 
inversely related to price.
Income Compensated Demand Curves
After Hicks presented the idea that income effects could have an 
effect upon a demand curve, he proceeded to develop a demand curve which 
took income effects into account. He called this an income compensated 
demand curve. Basically, he adjusted the Marshallian demand curve so as 
to allow for the effects of the changes in real income as different 
positions on the demand curve are taken up.
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There are several additional assumptions in conjunction with 
Marshall's analysis which underlie this demand curve. The first 
assumption dictates the presence of a weak preference ordering system. 
The assumption of weak preference ordering allows us to show that the 
consumption position which is chosen on the income compensated demand 
curve is preferred to any position which lies below the demand curve 
[Hicks 1956 p.43]. The assumptions underlying the income compensated 
curve mandate that the original amount consumed (A) must be indifferent 
to another amount consumed (B) which lies upon the same curve. This 
indifference is achieved through continually adjusting income so that 
the consumer is no better off at either position A or B. Since the 
consumer's income is continually adjusted for price changes or, the 
consumer's real income is held constant, the movement along the income 
compensated demand curve must only measure the substitution effects of 
price changes. Since substitution effects are always inversely related 
to price changes, so long as non-satiation holds, this demand curve must 
always slope downward.
A second assumption is that the generalized commodity M is 
available in amounts finely divisible. The third assumption, which I 
alluded to previously, pertains to the non-satiation of M. The consumer 
must always prefer more M to a lesser amount, given the consumption of X 
remains unchanged [Hicks 1956].
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Figure A3-3 shows an ordinary Marshallian demand curve AB and an 
income compensated demand curve Ab for a normal good. Marshall's curve 
lies outside that of Hicks'. This illustrates that for a price change 
from P to PI, the consumer has an additional amount of spending power 
associated with Marshall's curve. This is shown by the difference 
between the quantities of X purchased at P1. Hicks' income compensated 
demand curve lies below Marsahll's curve because all points on Hicks' 
curve have had real income adjusted.
The portions of demand theory that relate to the theory of 
consumer's surplus that go beyond the above points are presented in the 
main text. The Hicksian theory of demand is what the most current 
concepts concerning consumer's surplus are based upon. With a firm 
comprehension of this theory, the problems which currently beset 
consumer's surplus and the suggestions which are presented in this paper 
will be more readily understood.
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